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Abstract: 
 
Informal employment is a reality for roughly two-thirds of economically active youth 
in urban Egypt, and it has been argued to be correlated with poverty, poor working 
conditions, and few opportunities for advancement. This essay analyzes whether 
informal employment rewards job qualification measures, using survey data from 
2006 and a Blinder-Oaxaca wage decomposition. After creating a taxonomy of 
formal, para-formal, and informal modes of qualification, it is shown that formal 
public and formal private jobs tend to reward those with formal qualifications, while 
informal employment tends to reward informal qualification mechanisms. The notion 
that informal employment does not reward qualification is disputed. Furthermore, 
there are large wage premia based on formality of employment, region, and gender. 
The results can be explained by analyzing the formality decision and the qualification 
decisions of youth. This suggests an alterative explanation for “dualistic” outcomes in 
youth labor markets. 
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I. Introduction 
After nearly two decades of reform, youth in Egypt continue to have a difficult labor 
market position. Due to high population growth in the past decades, there are 900,000 new 
entrants to the Egyptian labor market per year and, partly due to limited opportunities, recent 
years have been marked by an increase in youth unemployment and informal employment.1 
Informal jobs, meanwhile, are often considered to be low-productivity, poorly paid jobs with 
inadequate working conditions and a high correlation with poverty. Accordingly, the topic of 
informal employment of youth has been snatched up by policymakers, and the creation of 
“decent work” for young Egyptians remains a major priority of the state and foreign 
development initiatives.2 
Given the scale of informal youth employment, the phenomenon has naturally received 
academic attention, as well. One central question on the issue is: do informal employment 
relationships reward job qualification? This rather simple question has both practical and 
theoretical importance. In practical terms, because of the sheer size of informal employment 
for youth, the returns to such qualification measures affect the incentives which youth are 
faced with, and may explain the degree and manner in which youth choose to become 
qualified. For issues of theory, the returns to qualification in the informal sector have 
important implications for the view of informal employment as part of a “marginalized 
sector”. The issue thus also weighs on considerations of informality as one section of a 
dualistic or segmented labor market, and for human capital theory. 
This essay takes up the returns to qualification in informal employment with a theoretical 
and empirical approach. The theoretical analysis is at the intersection of two literatures: that 
on human capital – a long-standing topic of analysis in labor economics – and that on 
informal economies – a topic of debate in the economic, sociological, and anthropological 
disciplines. The question also concerns the nature of informal employment, itself. If informal 
employment is merely an unregulated counterpart to formal employment, characterized by 
absence of taxes, free entry and competition, then human capital accumulation should occur 
as in theory; the returns should be present and correspond closely to productivity increases. If, 
on the other hand, informal employment is an unskilled safety net for those rationed out of the 
formal sector, it is conceivable that there will be few or no returns to qualification. 
The empirical findings of this essay imply that neither of these arguments accurately 
describe the situation. Rather, the evidence points to a view of informal employment as 
                                                
1See Amer, 2006; Ahlberg and Amer, 2000 
2 See the Egyptian Youth Employment National Action Plan of 2003, described in Samia Farid Shihata, “Decent Work is 
Good Business”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 17-23 Apr., 2008; further discussion in Section III. 
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following a different set of rules regarding qualification, rewarding primarily informal 
qualification modes for urban youth. After creating a taxonomy of formal, para-formal, and 
informal qualification mechanisms, worker data on urban youth from the nationally 
representative Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS 06) are introduced and a simple 
Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition is used to derive returns. It is shown empirically – with 
one-period and two-period data – that informal employment does, in fact, reward 
qualification, though primarily informal, demonstrable qualifications such as apprenticeships 
and on-the-job training which, due to the very nature of informal employment are more 
common than in the more formalized and “credentialist” types of formal private and formal 
public employment. There is also a formal/informal wage differential, which disappears when 
controlling for the individual, and which thus could be attributable to certain formality-
specific firm- and individual-level factors and persists because of both barriers and the outside 
options of formal and informal employment. For females, there are lower wages and returns 
to qualification across the board, which are most likely maintained through gender 
discrimination and monopsonistic employer behavior. 
The analysis of returns to human capital in Egypt is most closely related to the studies of 
Assaad (1996), Wahba (2000), and Said and El-Hamidi (2005; 2007), who also analyze the 
(sector- and gender-specific) returns to human capital using wage decomposition models. The 
key differences, besides the use of 2006 data, are the broader “qualification” definition of 
human capital, the sole focus on urban youth and the explicit separate empirical and 
theoretical treatment of informal employment.3  
The theoretical discussion, meanwhile, seeks to bridge human capital and informality 
literatures, showing how the assumptions of human capital accumulation change due to the 
unique individual and firm characteristics of informal employment. An essential component 
of this argument is that informal employment is both a result of certain microeconomic 
considerations, and a factor which itself has an effect on job characteristics and bargaining. 
The labor market for youth is “polarized” insofar as formality is anticipated and guides the 
training decisions of the informally employed into a formal or informal track. This may offer 
an alternative explanation to certain characteristics explained by the traditional dualist model. 
                                                
3 Assaad, 1996, focuses on the (formal and informal) private sector, analyzing the nature of the wage differential for social 
protection and varying returns to human capital. Wahba, 2000, conisders the public and private sectors separately and 
directly estimates returns to schooling. Said and El-Hamidi, 2005, compare the Egyptian and Moroccan experiences after 
structural adjustment to determine women’s returns to schooling, while Said and El-Hamidi, 2007, break down men’s and 
women’s white- and blue-collar employment to examine the effects of economic reform on gender inequality. 
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The break-down of the paper is as follows. Section II offers a critical discussion of the 
concepts, definitions, characteristics, and theories of informal employment – including the 
connection to human capital theory – by situating it in the literature on informal economies 
from across the economic and sociological literatures. Section III takes a closer look at 
informal employment relationships of youth in Egypt, and links them to prevalent modes of 
career qualification. Descriptive evidence seeks to make these considerations more concrete. 
In Section IV, data are introduced and analyzed descriptively, deriving some background 
results on the data, while in Section V, the data are used to derive empirical findings 
regarding the returns to career qualification measures among informally employed youth. The 
key results – using a simple uncorrected Oaxaca-Blinder model with one-period data and two-
period panel data – are that formal and informal employment reward differing types of 
qualification, with some large unexplained gender, union, and formality differentials. Section 
VI seeks to explain these results theoretically by analyzing the formality decision itself, the 
effects this has on the returns to qualification, and how qualification may tend toward a 
“polarized” outcome. This condition is then applied to the discussion of labor market dualism, 
with further analysis discusses gender-specific effects. Finally, section VII concludes and 
offers a few further avenues for research. 
 
II. Informal Employment in Comparative Perspective 
The concept of the informal economy – and the related ideas of a shadow economy, 
hidden economy, or underground economy4 – is readily familiar to observers of developing 
economies and labor markets, yet has bounds and definitions that vary and often defy easy 
categorization. Generally characterized by small firms, low capital intensity, decentralized 
organization, and the lack of regular accounts, the ranks of informal actors are large and 
scattered, geographically and sectorally, in most developing and developed economies. Thus, 
the concept encompasses “street vendors in Bogota, shoeshine workers in Calcutta, garbage 
collectors in Cairo, textile waste recyclers in Manila, homebased garment workers in Buenos 
Aires, and homebased electronics workers in West Yorkshire”5 all as “informal”. With such a 
broad purview, is it sensible to speak of a universal concept of informality? This section 
briefly surveys the literature as it relates to urban Egypt. 
                                                
4 While each of these terms have their own meanings in their contexts of use, further differentiation of these terms is not 
undertaken here. For the “hidden economy” in Egypt, see Roy, 1992; for the “shadow economy”, see Schneider, Friedrich, 
Enste, and Dominik, 2000; and for the “underground”/informal economy, see Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987, and Portes and 
Castells, 1989. 
5 Chen, Sebstad, and O’Connell, 1999, p. 603 
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The separate phenomena of the “informal sector”, “informal employment”, and “informal 
economies” are the subjects of a long series of academic and policy discussions dating back to 
the 1970’s, with a literature that spans the disciplines of economics, sociology, anthropology 
and political science. The seminal contribution came from Hart (1973), who described the 
informal income sources of Frafra migrants in the slums of Accra, providing an early study of 
the manifold mechanisms which urban “sub-proletariat” use to make a living outside of 
traditional wage employment.6 Following Hart, the concept of an “informal sector” was taken 
up by the International Labor Organization (ILO), and spawned a series of policy reports and 
surveys designed to better understand the sector and its relation to urban unemployment and 
poverty. An especially important effort was to come up with international definitions and 
characteristics.7 Extended in the 1980’s to fertile ground in the countries of Latin America 
and, in another vein, in immigrant enclaves in the United States, new advances were made in 
measurement and theory. Portes, Castells, and Benton (1989) compiled an extensive 
collection of work on informal economies throughout the Americas and Europe. De Soto 
(1987) also became well-known outside academic circles for the contention that informality 
mirrors excessive market regulations, supported by the “days to register a business” measures 
of regulatory burden and observations as a policy advisor in Peru.8 The literature has also 
been extended to applications in East and South Asia, the Arab countries,9 and the countries 
of OECD – where informal or “shadow” activities have become a topic of popular debate.10 
Throughout the discussion, labor markets have remained a primary focus. 
The economics literature, meanwhile, which had already dealt with “segmented” labor 
markets, began by absorbing this concept into the existing dualist framework. The traditional 
interpretation divided labor markets into a “primary” sector of high wages and protections – 
caused by, alternately, market regulation, union power, or the preponderance of efficiency 
wages – and a marginalized “secondary” sector, in which those pushed out of the formal 
sector by entry barriers could accept a lower wage.11 A central question came to be the extent 
to which such barriers could be tested and proven empirically. Numerous models sought to 
test segmentation with various selection models based on varying underlying assumptions.12 
These works, while capturing the essential aspect of the segmented labor market and barriers 
                                                
6 Hart’s analysis remains highly relevant and brings up some useful questions on how income is distributed across sectors. 
7 See Sethuraman, 1976, for a review. 
8 De Soto, 1987. I return to the concept of informality as a reaction to regulatory burden below. 
9 Mazumdar, 1982; Marcouiller, Castilla, and Woodruff, 1997; Maloney, 2004; Smith and Koo, 1983; Vernango, 2004. 
10 See Schneider and Enste, 2002 
11 Stiglitz, 1976; Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani, 1989 
12 Dickens and Lang, 1985; Gindling, 1991; Magnac, 1991; Günter and Launov, 2006 
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to formal entry, often did not go further in the discussion of pervasiveness of informality in 
the economy or its unique institutional characteristics. Explorations of definitional issues, 
characteristics, causes, and the link to human capital have been the critical areas where new 
results have been the most significant in furthering understanding. 
 
Definitions and dimensions of informality: informal economies and employment 
All work on informality has had to deal with the definitions, bounds, and characteristics 
of the nebulous and overlapping phenomena of “informality”, the “informal sector”, 
“informal employment” and “informal economies”. While uses tend to depend on context, 
clarity in these concepts is of great importance. In this section, the distinctions are introduced, 
with “informality” as the umbrella concept. 
At a basic level, the most useful definition of the informal economy has been that of 
Portes and Castells, by which the informal economy is:  
…a process of income generation characterized by one central feature: it is unregulated by the 
institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated.13 
 
This posits informality primarily as a legal condition, characterized by production outside the 
– socially and politically defined – bounds of state regulation, such as taxation, registration, 
safety and health standards, etc. This type of “extralegal” activity – or “the illicit production 
of licit goods” – contrasts to criminal activities, which involve the (illicit) production of illicit 
goods and services.14 The informal economy must be seen as economic activity which, for 
varying reasons, escapes regulation in an otherwise regulated and formalized economy, while 
informal employment is the label for the array of possible work relationships taking on these 
characteristics. The informal sector is that part of the economy where firms and workers are 
primarily informal, though the idea is often criticized for its implied clean distinction from the 
formal sector.15 
The creation of definitions of informality which are measurable and – as is especially 
important for empirical analysis – statistically tenable requires a more functional definition. 
Aside from the difficulty of measuring activities which are, by definition, unreported, 
categorization is a difficult issue. Thus, since the varying concepts of informality have been 
introduced, attempts have been made to categorize the nebulous group of “informal workers” 
and “informal firms” into clean, statistically applicable definitions – ideally capturing all 
possible dimensions of informality with an easily usable rubric. The definitions which have 
                                                
13 Portes and Castells, 1989, p. 12. This is also used by Assaad, 1993, and related to definitions used elsewhere in analysis of 
Egypt’s informal labor markets. 
14 Portes and Castells, 1989, p. 13. 
15 Ibid. 
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resulted include the sectoral, firm size, firm registration, labor contract, and social coverage 
criteria, with the main difference being the economic unit of analysis. 
Early economic work, recognizing the limitations, opted for a sectoral definition of 
informality, i.e. an informal sector, generally by first defining an explicitly formal sector. For 
example, in one study, “public sector employment … and large commercial establishments in 
the private sector, especially foreign-financed ones, are excluded”, so that “the informal 
sector, defined as a residual, includes all the remaining private enterprises in the urban 
economy.”16 Such a method, while easily applicable to data analysis, runs into serious 
problems of accuracy, the most pressing of which is the degree of heterogeneity among 
sectors and professions within (and, more starkly, between) countries, and particularly the 
heterogeneity of states of formality. A slightly more useful correlate of the “informal sector” 
thus involves firm size – a method officially adopted by the International Conference of 
Labor Statisticians in 199317 – with the justification that small firms are generally more 
invisible to regulation and thus, in general, more likely to be informal. Under the most 
common variants, all firms with fewer than 5 (or 10) workers – thus including workshops and 
vendors, household enterprises, and the self-employed – are defined as informal, while all 
firms with larger workforces – regardless of sector – are treated as formal. While this also has 
a form of justification in Egypt, where the 1981 Labor Law freed establishments of under 5 
persons from certain regulations, the obvious problems here is the existence of small, high-
capital formal enterprises and larger informal firms.18 This firm-level definition – and its 
more accurate yet work-intensive alternative, which categorizes firms as formal or informal 
based on legal definitions, such as formal registration, paying of taxes, or regular 
bookkeeping – does not necessarily lend itself to studying informal employment due to the 
incidence of informally employed workers within formal firms. Thus, one must separate the 
concept of informal employment from the informal sector and informal firms. 
Informal employment, in turn, is best captured in a worker-level definition, primarily 
contingent on the existence of a work contract and/or social insurance coverage. While 
individual-level data is needed, this is often available through independent surveys, making it 
tenable for wage analysis. The existence of such a definition made possible many new 
                                                
16 Sethuraman, 1976, p. 76 
An alternative method (particularly in the economics literature) has taken this further by using a residual after the deduction 
of the public sector and occupations which are more likely to be formal, such as “medical (doctors and nurses), social 
sciences, law … mail, mining, banking, insurance” and professions likely to be unionized (Gindling, 1991, p. 601). 
17 See ILO, 1993; the ICLS was refining an earlier definition. 
18 See Labor Law of 1981, Book 3, Article 59. 
An example from Prof. Alia El Mahdi of a small but clearly formal firm is a high-capital, two-man shoebox manufacturing 
operation in Giza which, while clearly operating in the realm of formal regulation, would fall out under this definition. 
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analyses, especially in the 1990’s.19 Yet even the individual-level suffers from ambiguity if, 
for example, a labor contract is not enforced, or states a lower actual salary than actually paid 
to reduce social security contributions. The question of unpaid family workers, small-scale 
self-employed or employers (SE/E) and infrequent casual laborers present further definitional 
difficulties. The collection of both formal and informal payments by small-scale 
entrepreneurs also creates states of semi-formality which may not be caught by individual 
classification. Nonetheless, the labor contract/social insurance definition presents a more 
useful gauge of “informal employment” than firm-level definitions. 
An ideal method may focus on the transaction level for informality which, however, is 
impractical for statistical analysis. Since informal transactions are by definition unrecorded – 
and would be extremely difficult to be identify exhaustively with surveys – it is unlikely that 
thorough statistical analysis would be possible. Where descriptive evidence can be obtained, 
this is an area in which sociological techniques have proven more successful and where 
fruitful research is taking place.20 This dimension of informality is likely the best one to serve 
discussion of “informal economies” or even “informalized economies”.21 
It is thus clear that each type of definition presents unique problems and captures only 
certain aspects of the phenomenon of informality. It is possible that, always dependent on 
national context, a variety of definitions are needed to capture essential elements, and that 
especially individual, transaction, and firm-level definitions are needed in different contexts. 
From here on, this paper will use “informal economy” to describe transactions, “informal 
firms” to define those outside regulatory functioning, and “informal employment” to define 
all relevant informal working relationships (paid or unpaid). Following the example of others 
in analyzing informal employment in Egypt,22 this paper uses a combination of the labor 
contract and social insurance criteria in distinguishing formal and informal workers. 
 
Characteristics of informal employment 
The features of informal employment for the informally employed vary across national 
contexts, as well, yet in general, informal employment relationships entail reduced social 
protection, a degree of legal invisibility, and lack of access to formal labor market institutions 
such as wage bargaining and the judicial recourse. For the goals of poverty reduction, 
                                                
19 In Egypt, the first such survey was the special round of the 1988 Labor Force Sample Survey, followed by the 1998 Egypt 
Labor Market Survey and 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, introduced below. Studies using the 1998 data – including 
on informal employment – are presented by El Mahdi and by Wahba and Mokhtar in Assaad (ed.), 2002. 
20 See Light, 2004; for Egypt, see Roy, 1992, who talks of the “hidden economy”. 
21 Light, 2004 
22 See use in Assaad, 1996, and in El Mahdi and Wahba and Mokhtar, in Assaad (ed.), 2002. 
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expansion of worker protections, a more even income distribution or sustainable productivity 
growth, informality can be – and often is – seen as a major setback.23  
Of course, disconnected from such welfare considerations there are other observable 
characteristics of informal employment which can be generalized from existing research. 
Here, several common themes can be identified, running through informality literature from 
the early 1970’s to the present, with some relating to the nature of informal firms and others 
relating to informal employment relationships, specifically. While they are taken from a 
variety of national contexts, they can be generalized and compared with research on urban 
Egypt. Here I present five main themes relating to informal firms – where the majority of 
informal workers are employed – and three relating to informal employment relationships – 
which are common to informal workers in and outside of formal and informal enterprises. 
The first firm-related theme is the integration into a small-scale, decentralized production 
network, a condition relating to small firm size and the need for invisibility in unregistered 
production.24 Second, informal working methods are characterized by low capital intensity – 
relating both to the legal and economic risks of high sunk capital costs for firms, and the 
difficulty of acquiring informal credit. This translates into a common situation where informal 
workers use little capital in production, and explains the concentration of informal activity in 
the services sector.25 A third theme is the dominance of family employment – much of it 
unpaid – as family enterprises continue to be a main feature of informal activity. 
A fourth recurring theme is the reliance on social networks in informal businesses, which 
Light (2004) refers to as “a network-based embeddedness … the opposite of neoclassical 
theory based on many buyers and many sellers who have no relations that could influence 
transactions”. As an example, many business owners seek to create personal linkages to 
suppliers and buyers which, in the absence of a more transparent formal market, ensure 
stability of materials and final product demand; this puts business owners, but also workers in 
a position of dependence on social contacts.26 As a fifth characteristic, transparency from the 
law results in a reluctance to work with state actors, and a specific avoidance of state 
bureaucracy, where possible. If interactions do exist, they may entail a fulfillment of only 
minimum standards of regulation in order to forestall severe consequences.27 Workers may 
often be party to such evasion practices. 
                                                
23 See the discussion in Avirgan, Bivens, and Gammage, 2005 
24 See ILO, 1972, which describes the informal sector as: small-scale, family-dominated, easy to enter, and based on 
indigenous resources; see also Portes and Castells, 1989; Light, 2004 
25 Again, see Portes and Castells, 1989; Light, 2004; for Egypt, see Mead, 1982; Galal, 2004 
26 Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993, discuss how such networks of social capital are maintained and used for economic gain. 
27 De Soto, 1987; Kamrava, 2004 
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Each of these is observable for workers of informal Egyptian firms. Relating to the fact 
that over 82% of enterprises in Egypt are informal, and over 90% of these are sole 
proprietorships with fewer than 5 workers, most informal workers work in an environment 
with only a few co-workers, or work alone.28 Evidence has shown that capital is relatively 
scarce or informally rented,29 while family-owned enterprises are common and may have 
increased in importance in the 1990’s.30 Social networks are clearly an advantage for 
businesses, and there is evidence of worker involvement in building and maintaining these 
ties. The avoidance of state institutions and enforcement (in the form of police) is also an 
important feature of informal activity. 
The three themes specific to informal working relationships may be found for employees 
in informal firms or (otherwise) formal firms,31 and are related to the condition of informal 
wage employment per se. First, due to the lack of standardization, a radical heterogeneity of 
wage outcomes may exist in informal employment relationships. Wages may be a matter of 
negotiation and personalized considerations, and depend heavily on business success or 
performance through, e.g. piece rates. This would imply an increased volatility and, for an 
outside observer, arbitrariness of pay rates, particularly in contrast to heavily standardized 
public sector pay schedules.32 Second, the lack of formal benefits such as vacation, maternity 
leave, or pensions may mean alternative arrangements, or simply a lack of pay during these 
work absences. Finally, informal wage employment may be much less regular and, like pay, 
the existence of work may depend on fluctuating business conditions. 
While these individual-relevant themes have been analyzed in Egypt, reviewing them and 
linking them to informal employment will be a task for later sections. 
 
Informalization of the labor market and explanations 
In a number of developed and developing countries, it can be shown that informal 
employment has grown faster than formal employment in the last decades.33 Yet, to an even 
greater extent than the definition of informality, the trends explaining a growth in informality 
                                                
28 Galal, 2004 
29 Mead, 1982, reports that informal Egyptian furniture makers tend to do all machine work outside the shop, with shared 
machinery that they pay a service fee for, rather than buying costly fixed equipment. This serves as a means of pooling 
capital costs and raising efficiency. 
30 See Meyer, 2000; El Mahdi, 2003. 
31 Again, it should be noted that the classification of firms is equally messy, and a firm which employs workers informally 
could thereby become informal or semi-formal.  
32 This result was derived in Assaad, 1996; deriving it from 2006 data is one aim in Section V. 
33 For Russia, El Salvador, India, South Africa, and Egypt see Avirgan, Bivens, and Gammage, 2005. Only in South Africa 
was informal employment declining as a proportion of total employment. See also the 76-country analysis in Schneider and 
Enste, 2002, which shows a steep increase in various definitions of the “shadow economy” between the 1970’s and 1990’s. 
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are highly country-specific and may even show considerable variation between a country’s 
regions – particularly between rural and urban areas. Some overarching frames of explanation 
can nonetheless be identified which seek to account for this growth. On the macro level, a 
rough distinction can be drawn between dualistic, structuralistic, and legalistic lines of 
thought.34 
Dualistic theories are the most common in the economic literature and draw on earlier 
models of labor markets which sought to explain productivity differentials through a high-
productivity “primary” and low-productivity “secondary” sector.35 One variant of this 
attributes the existence of the segmentation to efficiency wages or unionization, which create 
a protected market to well-paid primary jobs with union- or firm-created barriers to entry. The 
primary/secondary dichotomy can easily be extended to a formal/informal context, and 
conditions such as efficiency wages, minimum wage laws, labor protection, or formal 
qualification requirements can be the sources of barriers, pushing in one segment of the labor 
force into marginal, low-productivity positions without social protection. Recent contributions 
have problematized this distinction and theorized an informal sector which is, itself, divided 
into two parts – an “upper tier” competitive to the formal sector and a non-competitive “lower 
tier”.36 A very early debate around dualistic theories concerned whether the formal sector is 
“modern” while the informal sector is a “traditional” or “peasant” sector, destined to wane 
and disappear as growth occurs and market failures are hammered out.37 
Structuralistic explanations offer a rationale for why informality has grown over time. 
For example, it has been put forth that the increasing use of informal labor relationships in 
manufacturing is a response to cost pressures from international competition, a consequence 
of globalization. Dedeoglu (2004) identifies Turkish family-owned garment factories (atölye) 
– to which larger textile firms sub-contract for sale in both domestic and export markets – as a 
means of lowering costs and increasing flexibility with unpaid female household labor. Other 
sources, such as the analysis of the informal manufacturing sector in Cairo by Meyer (2000), 
report similar advantages of small-scale, decentralized production relationships, such as the 
ability to rapidly adjust wages and employment in periods of economic downturn. One 
interpretation of the structuralistic perspective thus sees informalization as a deliberate 
                                                
34 I owe this taxonomy to Avirgan, Bivens, and Gammage, 2005, who in turn are influenced by the four modes of explanation 
outlined by Chen, Sebstad, and O’Connell, 1999. 
35 See Doeringer and Piore, 1971 
36 Maloney, 1999, 2004; Günther and Launov, 2006 
37 Lewis, 1954; Piore, 1979; Fields, 1975; Stiglitz, 1976 all weigh in on the debate; ILO, 1972, criticizes the distinction. 
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strategy by large corporations to reduce labor costs and circumvent national labor laws. This 
remains applicable, however, only to sectors previously organized in large firms. 
More explicit attention to labor laws and institutions is provided through legalistic – or, 
relatedly, institutional – approaches to explaining informality, the most well-known of which 
is the work of De Soto (1987). De Soto, a former advisor to Peruvian President Alberto 
Fujimori, has spearheaded research on the accessibility of formal titles and registration 
procedures, including the now well-known indicator of the “days to register a firm”.38 
According to this approach, informal entrepreneurs are unable or unwilling to formalize their 
firms because of costly or burdensome labor, tax, and business regulations. This induces firms 
to use informal labor so long as regulatory laxness makes this possible.39 
Outside such schematic views, there are other more proximate causes on offer. Portes and 
Castells (1989) posit inter alia that the economic crises and restructuring of the 1970’s and 
1980’s caused a new surge in informal employment, which became a means of survival for an 
increasing number of marginalized people – especially youth, ethnic minorities, and women 
in developing countries. Kamrava (2002) argues that informality and “semi-formality” in the 
Middle East is a direct cause of weak state capacity and the strategies of rentierism and 
corporatism adopted by Middle Eastern states since independence. Schneider and Enste 
(2002) present the same discussion from the other side, arguing that the decision to operate 
informally reflects a lack of trust in state institutions – an “exit” from formal protection rather 
than exercising “voice” so as to change unfavorable conditions. 
In Egypt, informalization has been explicitly linked to the process of structural 
adjustment which took place in the 1990’s,40 and to legal and institutional characteristics. El 
Mahdi (2003) argues that the high incidence of informality in Egypt is a sign of institutional 
failure, and specifically a lack of attention to and appropriate policy for small enterprises by 
the responsible state actors. She outlines the multitude of steps needed for a street vendor to 
become formally registered, and argues that this is a major disincentive and a barrier to 
informal firm growth. Galal (2004) estimates that for an average informal firm, adherence to 
formal requirements of registration, bookkeeping, taxation, and exit would outweigh the costs 
of informality, which include “bribes, costly finance, and low protection”, costing an 
additional LE 14,900 yearly – more than the average per capita income in Egypt.41 
                                                
38 De Soto, 1987 
39 Almeida and Carneiro, 2006, apply this to Brazil, and find that where law enforcement is greater, firms use less informal 
labor yet also have lower productivity. 
40 Wahba and Mokhtar, 2002; Meyer, 2000 
41 Galal, 2004, p. 3. Because this study was published in 2004, using somewhat older data, it is unknown whether the results 
have since changed with the passing of new legal reforms and an increased focus on registration.  
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These micro-level analyses provide further explanations for the growth of informality in 
Egypt, and yet there are relatively few existing analyses which go further and examine the 
individual formality decision of employment. This will thus be brought up in the theoretical 
section, where issues of the causes of informality are returned to. 
 
Returns to human capital in informal employment 
Given dualist interpretations of informal employment, it is logical to view the informal 
sector as one of low productivity and few returns to human capital – an argument made 
explicitly by Dickens and Lang (1985). This has a number of variants. For example, “[i]t is a 
direct consequence of human capital theory that workers and firms will invest little in firm-
specific training if the worker is not expected to remain within the firm very long”.42 Or, 
given the initial assumptions of informal workers in primarily service positions, implying 
labor-intensive yet low value-added technologies, it is logical that long-time workers would 
have limited use of schooling and gain few job-specific skills, meaning little chance at 
advancement through experience. If informal employers – for structural or efficiency reasons 
– use labor less frugally, more as a homogenous input than a skilled service, it is imaginable 
that productivity enhancing measures are unnecessary.43 In such circumstances, entry into the 
formal sector may be the only option for advancement from low-paid and unstable work. 
If parts of informal employment are competitive to formal employment, however, as 
argued by Maloney (1998, 1999, 2004) and tested by Günther and Launov (2006), then it is 
thinkable that similar dynamics regarding returns to human capital prevail. If formal and 
informally employed workers use the same technology, then differences between returns to 
human capital would either be minimal, or would have to be due to non-productivity-related 
conditions such as effort observability or compensating wage differentials which have time 
components. Further still, it could be that the freedom of entry and lack of regulations actually 
promote a more competitive outcome whereby wage is linked more directly to productivity 
and thus to human capital investments.44 Or, if, as posited by Maloney (1998, p. 2), “informal 
salaried work is the entry point and perhaps training area for young workers”, who later take 
on formal work, then returns to human capital should be extant in the form of better 
opportunities in later formal employment. 
                                                
42 Dickens and Lang, 1985, p. 802 
43 Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani, 1989 
44 This argument is merely speculative; no source has gone, to my knowledge, so far as to claim this. 
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In Egypt, three existing empirical studies have investigated returns to human generally, 
including those in the public vs. private sector. The first of these is by Wahba (2000) who, 
using 1988 data on all Egyptian wage earners, and without distinguishing between formal and 
informal employment, finds increasing returns to education among wage earners, with 
primary and secondary school bringing smaller pay advantages and university paying much 
more. She interprets this unusual result as evidence of “credentialism” in the Egyptian labor 
market, whereby: “educational degrees provide a signal and serve as a convenient screen 
rather than improve workers’ productivity. This is especially true in the case of university 
degrees mainly due to the public sector hiring practices.”45 Said and El-Hamidi (2005) are 
interested in the effects of structural adjustment in Egypt and Morocco on women over time, 
yet also find this anomaly, referring to it as the “sheepskin effect”. From their analysis, it is 
demonstrated that primary and secondary schooling are little valued throughout the Egyptian 
labor market, and university education creates a disproportional jump – possibly relating to 
the particular dynamics of public sector employment.46 
Assaad (1996) is the only author who explicitly disaggregates formal and informal 
employment, attempting to measure the extent of the formal/informal wage differential by 
controlling for selection and human capital. The result of this estimation is that formal 
employment has slightly higher returns to education for men, and much higher returns for 
women, owing partly to wage discrimination in informal employment of women; another 
factor is the earlier exit from employment after marriage which, as mentioned above, directly 
discourages human capital accumulation. On top of these varying returns, there is a large 
unexplained wage differential between formal and informal employment, which – even before 
taking into account fringe benefits of formal employment – implies an 85-90% job rent in 
formal over informal employment. 
This paper is closest in its empirical framework to Assaad, and attempts to extend the 
analysis with a more thorough treatment of qualification mechanisms, an explicit separation 
of sector of employment, and recently available data. Before results for informal employment 
can be derived, however, a qualitative analysis of informal employment and human capital – 
in the broadened form of “qualification” – is in order for urban Egyptian youth. 
                                                
45 Wahba, 2000, p. 32 
46 Specifically, those university graduates who are employed can expect a high wage level, while other university graduates 
are unemployed due to the job queue, and thus fall out of the sample. This may be one case of selection bias – but the returns 
to university education may also actually be much higher. 
For a humorous account of a type of credentialism in Egypt, see Galal Amin’s Whatever (Else) Happened to the Egyptians? 
(Cairo, AUC Press: 2004), Ch. 15, “The Doctorate”, in which he lambasts how doctorate holders in Egypt are given – in his 
view – undue license in the media on the basis of academic title. 
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III. Informal Employment and Qualification of Urban Egyptian Youth 
In this section, an analysis of informal employment and career qualification among urban 
Egyptian youth is given, based on primary and academic sources and some limited interview 
evidence from a 3-week field study.47 These observations are meant to serve as a supplement 
and backdrop for the more formal derivation of results from survey data in Section IV. 
Besides the economic context and extent of mass informal employment of youth, the focus is 
on formal and informal labor market institutions, and methods of formal and informal job 
qualification, broken down into formal, para-formal, and informal mechanisms. 
I begin with an overview of the scope and distribution of informal employment in urban 
Egypt. With the processes of structural adjustment and the shrinking of the public sector in 
the 1990’s, there are indications that informal employment actually increased between 1988 
and 1998, in both absolute and relative terms. In the labor force as a whole, 34% of non-
agricultural wage workers (NAWW) in 1998 were informally employed, including 64% in the 
15-29 age group.48 This has been accompanied by at least three further trends of relevance for 
youth. First, there was a radical defeminization of the labor market across sectors – and 
especially in the self-employed and employer categories, where 7% and 15% of women, 
respectively, had worked in 1988, and only 0.7% and 3% of a smaller women’s labor force 
worked in 1998.49 It can be shown that more women have left the labor force since.50 A 
second trend was growing unemployment among youth, and especially vocational school and 
university graduates, such that by 2006, 22% of all male and 39% of female university 
graduates in the 15-29 group were unemployed.51 Finally, youth entering the labor force were 
much more likely to begin their working career in informal employment relationships, in 
contrast to earlier generations who had often found their way directly into government or 
public enterprise employment. Studies of labor market insertion of youth have confirmed that 
at least 30% of youth entrants by 2006 were employed in regular informal wage work, with 
another 10 to 15% employed informally on an irregular basis. Private formal work 
represented a small but growing share of 10%.52 
                                                
47 The primary interview partners in this study were representatives of the German Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Cairo Regional Unit of the Dual System (RUDS), TVET Reform Programme, and Population 
Council, as well as some casual conversations in the al-Darb al-Ahmar area. While a larger, representative study with survey 
evidence would have been desirable, this was not possible given time constraints. Recognizing the limitations, I will draw on 
the findings of these interviews for some qualitative information. Formal results using professionally collected from the 
ELMPS are derived in Section IV. 
48 Wahba, 2002, according to the social security and contract definition 
49 El Mahdi, 2002 
50 Assaad, 2007, shows that the recent fall in female unemployment was due mainly to labor force exit. 
51 Amer, 2007, according to the standard unemployment and market labor force definition. 
52 Assaad, 2007 
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All of these phenomena point to a situation in which a growing labor force – represented 
at the margin by youth – was unable to be absorbed into the stagnant public sector or the 
limited number of formal private jobs, and hence entered informal work or unemployment, 
with particularly severe barriers for young women. This relates, however, not only to the 
demographic change of Egypt but also to institutional factors. These, along with the 
institutions of the informal employment, provide needed background. 
 
Formal and informal institutions of urban labor markets for youth 
Since the Revolution of the Free Officers in 1952 and the experiment with “Arab 
Socialism” under President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, the labor market in Egypt was defined by 
a high degree of central planning and a marginalization of more traditional industries. 
Employment growth was driven in the 1960’s by the public sector, including the civil service 
and state-run enterprises – mainly nationalized industries in textiles, energy, and 
manufacturing. With the drive to increase education and make up for the lack of skilled 
workers following the exodus of foreigners in the 1950’s, one of the chief policies of public 
sector employment growth was the employment guarantee for graduates – a program initiated 
to encourage higher education by guaranteeing all graduates of universities and, later, higher 
vocational education, of a state job. Through the 1970’s, the conditions of such jobs were 
extremely favorable, including relatively high real wages, short working hours, social security 
and healthcare benefits, and access to subsidized goods and, in some cases, housing. Studies 
have posited that this guarantee and the high wages and benefits of the public sector 
contributed to a simultaneous oversupply of graduates and their relative undersupply of them 
in the private sector.53 
The implementation of the Intifah or “Open Door” policy by President Anwar Sadat 
beginning in 1974 brought about a much greater role of the private sector in growth and 
employment – and a parallel emphasis on the private sector in creating employment and 
economic opportunity. The new Labor Law of 1981 sought deliberately to “extend protection 
to all workers in the private sector”,54 providing for a system of enforceable labor contracts, 
social insurance, a minimum wage, 21 days of vacation per year, 50 days paid maternity 
leave, de facto lifetime employment security, a cap on working hours, and representation in 
trade unions.55 On the other hand, state control continued to play a large role, as job 
                                                
53 Assaad, 1997 
54 Awad, 1981, Preface to the translation of the Labor Law; Labor Law of 1981 
55 Labor Law of 1981, art. 80-83 (labor contract), 154 (maternity leave), 71-75 (termination of employment), etc. 
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recruitment was to take place centrally and trade unions were to be subsumed under the 
leadership of a Labor Supreme Council of the Ministry of Manpower and Training.56 
The legal institutions of the state only apply, however, in their actual enforcement, and 
this issue has been critical. Following the implementation of a structural adjustment program 
beginning in 1991, public employment growth was drastically curtailed, and the state 
employment guarantee eroded to the point of irrelevance – with waiting lists often reaching 
10 years for a state job, in which time informal employment disqualified a candidate.57 The 
Labor Law of 1981, meanwhile, was only partially enforced, and it is possible that the state 
had no interest or ability to regulate certain sectors of the economy.58 These factors go a long 
way toward explaining the rise in informality through 1998. This was partly reversed in 2003, 
with the passing of the new Labor Law, which introduced greater flexibility, and with a new 
drive by the state toward formalization. Nonetheless, it can still be shown that in 2006, a 
majority of youth were employed informally.59 
For these broad “unregulated” swathes of the labor force, it would nonetheless be a 
mistake to argue that no constraining institutions exist. Indeed, in the both the formal and 
informal economies there are parallel informal market institutions, enforced by social 
pressure, custom, and shared societal imagination.60 It is likely that these are yet stronger in 
the informal economy, however, due precisely to the lack of formal regulation to overcome 
recurring coordination problems and areas of contention. Assaad (1993), in studying the 
Cairene construction industry, identifies informal counterparts to three sets of formal 
institutions, finding that in every case the informal institutions are stronger. Specifically, local 
coffee houses trump trade unions as fora for workers to convene, gain group representation, 
and search for jobs; casual labor is universally more common than contract work in 
construction; and traditional apprenticeships are held in higher esteem than government 
training initiatives, especially for highly skilled craftsmen. Other studies find a similarly 
strong role for informal labor market institutions. Investigating the small-scale Egyptian 
furniture industry, Mead (1982) finds a strongly institutionalized use of child labor during 
school breaks. Meyer (2000) discusses constraints on the use of reserve family labor. 
In the course of interviews regarding the small-scale manufacturing sector in Cairo, it 
was revealed that in the absence of legal regulation, informal labor market “arrangements” for 
                                                
56 Ibid., art. 16-18 (regarding recruitment) and art. 76-78 (collective labor relations). 
57 Assaad, 1997 
58 See Kamrava, 2002; Galal, 2004, also discusses the debate on formalization in Egypt. 
59 See data in Section IV. 
60 See Schlicht, 1996. Here, I constrain myself to examples in the informal economy as they relate to youth employment. 
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sick leave, vacation, recruitment, promotion and pay persist in these sectors in semi-
standardized forms. When a worker is sick, for example, he or she is not entitled to pay, but 
may often take out credit which is to be deducted from later pay. Some employers may refuse 
this, however.61 Job recruitment is also likely to run through informal channels – such as 
extended family contacts or neighbors – with, again, informal mechanisms of guaranteeing 
both the suitability of a worker and of a job.62 Pay systems appears to vary radically 
depending on the context, yet various combinations of piece rates and weekly wages, along 
with contingent methods of performance pay or profit sharing, appear to be common. 
In the division of labor, the role of the shopkeeper appears to be especially well defined. 
The owner of an establishment may often work alongside employees, overseeing their work, 
providing training, and coordinating relations with suppliers and buyers. Negotiation skills, 
business acumen, acceptance of volatile earnings, and the provision of capital seem to be 
rewarded with capture of higher pay in profits, explaining one reason why shop owners are 
often the source of informal credit.63 For workers, earnings tend to be more constant; for the 
self-employed, earnings may be low and quite erratic, meaning that economic activity is often 
quite precarious.64 
These observations are merely preliminary and of limited depth, yet they may provide 
some concrete impulses for making sense of the informal institutional environment. 
 
Modes of qualification in the formal and informal sectors 
Of the most important institutions of the labor market are those which heighten 
productivity and employability through education and training. These can be broadly bundled 
under the headings of “human capital development”, “skills training”, or “career 
qualification”. Here, I opt for the broadest measure of “qualification” to capture all activities 
which a worker engages in that directly or indirectly raise productivity and employability. 
The decision to broaden the definition of qualification beyond formal schooling and work 
experience is not new, and has been the focus of policy debate – if not always economic 
analysis – in many national contexts.65 In Egypt, the full range of qualification mechanisms 
                                                
61 The same may occur in the case of a sick family member, or in a particularly “tight” month. Because of community-
enforced trust and social sanctioning, repayment is likely enforced 
62 In the case of a privately facilitated job match, an intermediary may be held responsible for both the employer and 
employee. See Cunningham and Sarayrah, 1994, who discuss the role of “wasta” – translated as “intercession” or “social 
contacts” – in development in the Arab world. 
63 See Mohieldin and Wright, 2000, who discuss informal credit markets, though with a focus on rural Egypt. 
64 An interesting example of this group is provided in the discussion of independently operating street salesmen of karkadey, 
a popular hibiscus drink, in “The Hibiscus Seller”, The Egyptian Gazette, May 28, 2008, p. 3. 
65 For a discussion of broader measures of human capital in Canada, see Livingstone, 1997. 
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have been targeted for policies regarding youth employment for both national policy and  
international development actors, with the frequent argument that further skills development 
is vital to create a more qualified workforce capable of further employment and 
employability.66 While the spectrum of potential qualification mechanisms is intentionally 
quite broad, a useful division of these is into formal, “para-formal” and informal modes of 
qualification.67 Despite the parallels to formal and informal employment it is important to 
note that each mode could be applicable to formal or informal jobs, as well. 
Formal qualification is likely the most obvious and includes the national education 
system including university and technical schooling. Public education in Egypt is divided into 
primary schools (1st – 6th grades), secondary (7th – 9th grade), and vocational education (3-5 
years following secondary schooling) or preparatory school (3 years for preparation for 
university).68 Higher education is possible at universities and technical colleges, to which 
graduates of preparatory school (but not vocational education) have a legal right. There are 
commonly leveled critiques of the Egyptian education system including the high class size, 
poor pay of teachers, need for private lessons or study groups, and rigor of yearly 
standardized tests, which have high failure rates and tend to block students who have failed 
from advancement. This, along with the costs of books, private lessons, transport, and 
foregone labor income, are partial explanations for the high incidence of non-enrollment in 
Egypt, the other being child labor.69 Nonetheless, the enrollment rate has increased over the 
last decades, climbing from 84% in 1991 to 94% of primary age children in 2004.70 
The large role of technical education in the education system relates, again, to the 
education drive following the Egyptian Revolution. In technical education, three- and five-
year courses in agriculture, industry, and commerce are offered in a class-like setting. Again, 
there is a frequent claim that education quality is poor, techniques taught are out-dated, and 
graduates are unlikely to use their knowledge in their later field of work.71 University 
education has become much more common in the last several decades but, as previously 
                                                
66 Egyptian state initiatives have included the creation of vocational education schools and numerous individual initiatives 
through the 1960’s and 70’s, as well as the Social Fund for Development, and new activities outlined in the 2003 Youth 
Employment National Action Plan. Some external actors in this sector are: the European Union through the European 
Training Foundation and co-funded TVET Reform Programme, and GTZ through the Mubarak-Kohl Initiative and, more 
recently, MKI Vocational Education, Training and Employment Program (MKI-vetEP). 
67 I owe this division to Guido Lotz, who provided very helpful comments on career qualification. The phrase “para-formal” 
is my own and is intended to avoid confusion with the ambiguous term “semi-formal”. 
68 An alternative to state education is the traditional Islamic Azhari education, which remains common in rural areas of Egypt 
but which is declining in importance in urban areas. 
69 See Wahba, 2006. Regarding a recent initiative by Egyptian First Lady Suzanne Mubarak against child labor and for 
enrollment, see Reem Leila, “Child labour online”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 3-9 Jul., 2008. 
70 United Nations Development Fund, Human Development Report 2007/2008 (New York: UNDP, 2008) 
71 Al Heeti and Brock, 1997; see also Lotz, 2008; Laila Iskandar, “Formalising the Informal”, Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 27 
March – 2 April, 2008 
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implied, is sometimes seen as a mere credential without great advantage for skill acquisition 
or productivity growth, or connection to later work activity. These are nonetheless 
prerequisites for government employment and, accordingly, the number of graduates of each 
increased greatly under the graduate employment guarantee.72 The Egyptian state also 
formally certifies a number of occupations – particularly skilled technicians – although this 
formal qualification mechanism is not always respected in the private economy.73 
Formal qualification mechanisms are complemented by para-formal mechanisms, which 
can be defined to include all officially recognized modes of qualification not captured under 
the national education system – i.e. courses outside of schools or university, formal work 
experience, and formalized skills training. For example, government or community-sponsored 
literacy programs may serve as a means of attaining literacy skills not acquired in primary 
schooling. Publicly and privately offered language and computer courses offer certifiable 
training modes in these areas.74 Formal work experience is also a semi-formal means of 
qualification, in that it – while not officially part of formal training initiatives – can be 
certified; this type of experience, along with any on-the-job training entailed by it, can be 
declared to a formal employer without problem. 
The role of informal qualification mechanisms, meanwhile, is quite large, particularly in 
informal employment. The most well-known of these is the traditional industrial 
apprenticeship (sabi’ana senai’ana) system – common especially in construction, artisan 
trades, among mechanics, and for other skilled trades. Dating back to the guild system of the 
19th century, the apprenticeship remains a roughly standardized institution with set norms 
including “discipline and absolute loyalty to one’s master, the willingness to tolerate harsh 
disciplinary measures, verbal and physical abuse, and the willingness to work for an extended 
period of time at very low wages”.75 This likely overlaps to a great extent with ordinary on-
the-job training which, while less institutionalized, also takes place in informal employment 
relationships. Mead (1983) points out how apprentices are often used for menial tasks, such as 
fetching food, with sometimes very irregular training components. Nonetheless, workers and 
apprentices with a long-term attachment to a shop owner may be trained quite thoroughly. 
An equally significant mode of informal qualification may be implicit knowledge and 
social contacts. For formal employment, this is likely to be very useful to overcome hurdles to 
                                                
72 Assaad, 1997 
73 Assaad, 1993, mentions the lack of acceptance of so-called “October workers” trained in a state initiative following the 
1973 war. 
74 See the discussion in Bhaumik et al., 2004 
75 Assaad, 1993, p. 932 
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recruitment from a broad pool of candidates; particularly a mastery of formal signals and 
presentation skills may be of use in recruitment for well-paid formal jobs.76 In informal 
employment, social contacts are crucial not only for finding work, but also for the operation 
of small business (especially for those higher up in the hierarchy) and for individual wage 
bargaining and earnings supplementation. Avoiding the legal consequences of enforcement is 
also likely to be easier with good contacts or knowledge of enforcement mechanisms.77 For 
this reason, it can be hypothesized that implicit knowledge – while not measurable – is very 
likely to contribute to success in both formal and informal environments.  
This taxonomy of qualification institutions is not exhaustive, yet offers an idea of the 
type of mechanisms that are relevant to youth in urban Egyptian labor markets. By finding 
corresponding measures in the available data, returns to qualification in the form of wages can 
be measured. 
 
IV. ELMPS Data and Descriptive Results 
Empirical analysis is based on data from the Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey 
(ELMPS) 2006, a nationally representative household survey carried out in 2005/2006 by the 
Economic Research Forum (ERF) and Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and 
Statistics (CAPMAS). The survey, conducted through household visits, served as a follow-up 
to comparable national labor market surveys from 1998 and 1988. With a sample of 8,349 
households and 37,140 individuals, the household make-up was weighted using census 
statistics and includes a wealth of household and individual-level information.78 The data – 
along with data from the 1988 and 1998 survey rounds, which together create a panel 
dimension – have been used extensively for analysis of labor market participation, 
unemployment, gender discrimination, and employment characteristics.79 Here, they will 
serve as the basis for descriptive, entry, and wage analysis of formal and informal 
employment of urban youth. 
To only capture those individuals who are the object of this study, a preliminary filter 
captures all individuals who: 1) are between the ages of 15 and 29 at the time of the survey 
(determined by birth year), 2) live in an urban area, as defined by the Egyptian census 
                                                
76 Here, again, there is a broad literature on the importance of non-measurable social knowledge and social networks in 
economic success, which extends well beyond the informal sector. The phenomenon also clearly relates to the EU focus on 
“employability”, cited especially often in labor market projects in Egypt. See ILO, 2007. For a recent psychological analysis 
of the concept, see Fugate and Kinicki, 2008, who discsuss the role of individual disposition in learning and employability.  
77 See Bourdieu, 1972; Portes, 1998 
78 Barsoum, 2007 
79 Analyses using the 2006 data include Assaad, 2007; and El Mahdi and Rashed, 2007,. 
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definition, and 3) have been in the labor market in the past 3 months.80 In 2006, this generates 
a sub-sample of 2,204 economically active urban youth, distributed across government, public 
enterprise, and private employment in formal and informal wage worker, self-employed, 
employer, and unpaid family worker status. “Formal” is defined by the presence of a labor 
contract or social insurance coverage, while “informal” is the lack of both. The other 
employment status categories are based on answers provided by the individual. Wage data are 
available only for wage workers, totaling 1,571 individuals, along with a series of entries on 
bonus, incentive, overtime, and profit sharing pay. These measures, in turn, can be added 
(adjusting for the reported pay period) and divided by reported weekly working hours to 
generate a single variable on hourly earnings. While some individuals – especially those 
employed in the civil service – have secondary jobs, these are left out for simplicity. 
Qualitative questions whose responses are in the form of categories can provide 
information on sector and place of work, job stability, and means of finding the job.81 
Geographic information is available, as well, to correct for regional differences in wages.82 To 
capture the various modes of qualification, variables must be identified which correspond to 
the formal, semi-formal, and informal institutions outlined above. Formal qualification modes 
can be recorded through years or level of school, type of school, university education, and 
registration of a profession. Variables corresponding to semi-formal means are more difficult, 
but include participation in a government language or computer course, or experience in 
formal employment. Other means are not available in the data. Informal qualification modes 
such as the industrial apprenticeship can be captured by response to individual questions on 
where skills were attained, in which there is evidence of the institutionalized industrial 
apprenticeship and various skill levels. Informal work experience can also be measured by 
entry into the labor force and the presence of a contract in the first job. The presence and 
quality of social contacts is a variable which cannot be measured but which is surely 
correlated with both earnings potential and job status.83 
There are other limitations to the data which deserve mentioning. First, data was 
collected entirely through household surveys and may suffer from a variety of reporting 
                                                
80 Participation in the labor force is based on the extended definition, which includes home-based economic activities in 
addition to market work. See Assaad, 2007 for a discussion of the differences. 
81 Many of these variables are only available consistently for wage-workers. 
82 In the sample, Greater Cairo makes up 21% of individuals, Alexandria and the Suez Canal Cities are 19%, urban Lower 
Egypt is 26% and urban Upper Egypt is 34% of all individuals. This geographical skew is partly a result of the very different 
age structure in different regions of Egypt – i.e. a much higher relative youth population in upper Egypt – and also a result of 
unweighted use of the data. Attempts at weighting the data are not made here. 
83 It would be beyond the bounds of a national survey to collect such information exhaustively, though it is interesting to note 
that recent sociological research has constructed such measures of social capital. For an interesting example relating to the 
power of social networks for immigration to the US from Northern Mexico, see Palloni et al, 2001. 
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biases. Particularly data on earnings may be inaccurate due to under- or overreporting. 
Secondly, while the survey was meant to be nationally representative, the use of the urban 
youth filter may compromise this, and reduce the sample size greatly. It is believed that this 
focus is justified, as it allows a deeper understanding and more differentiated results than 
combining urban and rural and youth and non-youth. The data is unweighted, meaning an 
overrepresentation of Upper Egypt and underrepresentation of Cairo. Third, there is no 
variable available in the data which can accurately predict formality of employment, and 
which is not correlated with wage, meaning the issue of selection bias cannot be adequately 
overcome (see below). Fourth, firm size was not consistently available, even though tests 
showed that firm size effects on wages could be significant. The variable was dropped due to 
problems with missing observations. Finally, the data on earnings are static and, although a 
panel dimension is available, it is only applicable for those individuals who were in the labor 
force 8 years ago and were part of the 1998 survey. With these limitations in mind, the data 
can be used to derive empirical results. 
 
Descriptive characteristics of youth employment, formality, and sectoral distribution 
Some descriptive statistics of the economically active youth are provided in Table 1. In 
the sample, 71% of economically active individuals (61% of women, 75% of men) are wage 
workers; women are clearly underrepresented among employers and self-employed, but 
overrepresented among unpaid family workers. In the sample as a whole, only 27% of all 
economically active individuals and 23% of all wage workers are female. Of wage workers, 
44% are formally employed using the combined labor contract / social insurance definition; 
the overlap between labor contract and insurance is strong but not perfect. Interestingly, a 
majority of female wage workers (64%) but a minority of males (39%) are formally 
employed, reflecting the previously derived84 fact that informally employed women are 
scarcer and more likely to leave the labor force after marriage. This is borne out by the age 
structure of women’s employment: participation in informal work for women peaks at age 23, 
while formal employment is relatively constant for all cohorts 23 and above. Statistics on age 
of entry for both males and females show that workers in formal employment generally 
entered the labor force later (mode age: 21) than informal and non-wage workers (mode age: 
17) – presumably after the completion of formal secondary or university education. 
                                                
84 Assaad, 2007 
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An especially interesting result is found in the sectoral distribution of formal and 
informal workers between government (civil service), public enterprise, foreign, non-
establishment, and private employment. As expected, private employment plays the dominant 
role for youth overall, and here, most males and females are informally employed or are non-
waged (employers, self-employed, or unpaid family workers). Government and public 
enterprise employees, meanwhile, are predominantly formal, yet here there is also an 
incidence of public sector workers who report having no contract and no social insurance. 
This implies either that the indicator for informality is imperfect, or that Egyptian state 
agencies and state-owned firms also employ workers informally – or quite possibly both. An 
important question is whether these individuals are more similar to other (formal) public 
employees, or to other (private) informal workers. Since this cannot be determined 
conclusively, the following sections will divide formal public and private workers, and group 
all informal workers – whether public, private, or other – into one “informal” category. 
 
Table 1 –  Employment and age profile statistics     
       
Employment status:      
 Wage worker Employer Self-employed Unpaid family work Total  
Male 1,213 113 134 156 1,616  
Female 358 4 12 214 588  
Total 1,571 117 146 370 2,204  
       
Formality of Employment:*   Combined Formality Definition:*  
 Contract No contract Total   Formal Informal Total  
Social insurance 510 56 566  Male: 468 745 1213  
No insurance 131 874 1,005  Female: 229 129 358  
Total 641 930 1,571  Total: 697 874 1,571  
       
Sector of employment:      
 Government Public Enterprise Private Joint Venture Foreign/other No establishment 
Formal (male) 143 61 203 23 2 36 
Informal (male) 4 11 465 6 2 257 
Non-wage (male) - - 403 - - 1 
Formal (female) 143 13 70 2 - - 
Informal (female) 7 1 115 1 1 5 
Non-wage (female) - - 230 - - 1 
Total 297 86 1,486 32 5 300 
      
Current age:      
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Total   
Formal (male) - - - 4 8 5 9 26 26 43 66 70 65 76 70 468   
Informal (male) 18 15 19 38 47 44 50 55 74 69 64 77 72 59 44 745   
Non-wage (male) 5 13 17 18 16 16 16 35 29 30 30 45 41 52 41 404   
Formal (female) 1 - - 1 4 10 18 17 21 28 29 27 19 31 23 229   
Informal (female) 4 - 10 6 8 11 11 12 16 9 13 9 6 10 4 129   
Non-wage (female) 7 12 12 10 24 12 20 17 15 16 19 16 26 15 10 231   
Total 35 12 22 95 126 118 145 184 204 219 246 270 256 271 221 2,204   
       
Age of entry into labor force:      
 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
Formal (male) - - - 1 2 5 10 10 11 12 10 17 46 45 41 36 67 60 43 31 17 10 4 - 
Informal (male) 3 1 7 5 28 19 53 36 47 79 46 70 82 70 52 38 41 29 14 5 12 5 1 2 
Non-wage (male) 4 3 10 4 27 13 28 25 23 46 26 41 68 41 34 25 25 24 17 9 3 1 1 - 
Formal (female) - - - - - - - 2 - - 3 7 14 13 15 36 38 38 23 22 11 5 2 - 
Informal (female) - - 1 - 1 1 3 4 - 6 3 15 23 11 14 10 11 14 2 3 3 4 - - 
Non-wage (female) - 4 6 2 9 10 9 4 4 8 9 20 14 22 22 15 24 14 5 2 6 1 - - 
Total 77 4 7 2 10 11 12 93 4 14 112 186 264 220 197 180 227 201 127 96 77 52 35 2 
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*only wage workers      
  
An additional result of importance is the even ratio of male and female employment in 
government; women actually represent a slight majority of government employees, at 51%. It 
has been claimed that government jobs are much more accessible to women and more 
egalitarian in the pay structure, which is one factor behind the “feminization” of the civil 
service in the past decades.85 In every other sector, including public enterprises, joint 
ventures, and especially the private sector, women make up less than 30% of the employed. 
 
Modes of qualification 
Table 2 shows the distribution of qualification mechanisms by gender and type of 
employment for wage workers. Formal qualification is, again, represented by schooling and 
university. Schooling is distributed between illiterate (9.5%), primary/literate (15%), 
preparatory (6%), general/vocational secondary (39%), post-secondary (5.5%) and 
university/post-graduate (26%) education. Vocational secondary school graduates – of which 
most have attended vocational education in industry (57%) or commerce (35%) – are more 
likely to be employed informally, whether male or female, with only 37% of males and 43% 
of females in public or private formal employment.86 The opposite is true for university 
graduates, who at 67% (males) and 83% (females) are universally more likely to be formally 
employed. This may partly reflect the continuing role of the state as an employer for 
graduates, although especially for male university graduates, private formal employment is 
quite sizeable at 39%. Most – but not all – illiterates are employed informally. The 
primary/literate and preparatory categories are actually less likely than illiterates to be 
formally employed, at 18% and 23%, respectively, vs. 28% for illiterates. Interestingly, a full 
19% of illiterate wage workers in the sample are employed formally in the public sector. 
Para-formal and informal qualification mechanisms are not measured directly in the data, 
and therefore must be analyzed indirectly – for example through the survey questions, “Does 
your job require any skill?” and “How did you acquire that skill?” as well as job history (see 
below). A majority of male and female formal employees report being skilled and having 
gained this skill through regular schooling; this method is much less common among informal 
workers (10% of males and 8% of females). Of informal workers, 14% of males and 17% of 
                                                
85 Said and El-Hamidi, 2008; it is important to note that they also find a slight reverse in the trend with data up through 2004. 
86 Contrary to expectations, there is no significant difference in the sectoral or formal/informal distribution of vocational 
secondary graduates by field. Graduates in industry, commerce, and agriculture appear equally well-represented in formal 
public, formal private, and informal employment. 
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females reported having acquired the skill required for the job primarily in on-the-job training 
or in computer and language courses – i.e. para-formal qualification modes. These modes are 
also common (17% and 13.5%, respectively) among male and female private formal workers, 
but not common among those in public employment.87 
Especially among the informally employed, indications of informal qualification 
mechanisms can be found: for example, 43% of males and 15% of females learned a skill for 
their current job through a craftsman. It can be speculated that this group learned or is 
learning primarily through the traditional apprenticeship or informal on-the-job training in a 
skilled trade. Over half of those trained by craftsman had already become craftsmen, 
themselves, while the remaining 42% of males and 49% of females were assistants or 
apprentices. 21% of all craftsmen and apprentices, male and female, are formally employed. 
 
Table 2 –  Modes of qualification by employment group      
       
Educational attainment:*      
 Illiterate Primary/literate Preparatory Gen./voc. second. Post-secondary Univ./post-grad. 
Formal, pub (male) 13 6 8 84 21 72 
Formal prv (male) 13 32 7 104 11 97 
Informal (male) 96 175 64 305 28 77 
Formal, pub (fem.) 16 - - 37 15 88 
Formal, prv (fem.) - 4 6 14 3 46 
Informal (female) 10 15 3 67 8 25 
Total 149 232 88 611 86 405 
       
Type of secondary/higher education:†      
 Gen. sec./post sec. Vocational – agr. Vocational – ind. Vocational – com. University 4yr. Univ. 5yr./post-gr. 
Formal, pub (male) 22 3 58 22 64 8 
Formal, prv (male) 13 6 76 20 84 13 
Informal (male) 38 23 186 86 74 3 
Formal, pub (fem.) 15 2 5 30 80 8 
Formal, prv (fem.) 3 - 5 9 43 3 
Informal (female) 9 3 16 47 24 1 
Total 93 37 346 214 369 36 
       
Means of skill attainment for current job:*     
 Regular school Voc. training Through contractor Through craftsman OTJ/courses No skill required 
Formal, pub (male) 125 13 1 7 13 45 
Formal, prv (male) 95 13 1 47 47 61 
Informal (male) 68 13 44 317 105 198 
Formal, pub (fem.) 130 3 - - 3 20 
Formal, prv (fem.) 44 6 - 3 10 10 
Informal (female) 29 4 - 19 22 55 
Total 491 52 46 393 200 389 
       
Skill level: ‡      
 Apprentice Assistant Craftsman Total   
Formal, pub (male) - 7 12 19   
Formal, prv (male) - 22 54 76   
Informal (male) 33 125 225 383   
Formal, pub (fem.) - - - -   
Formal, prv (fem.) 1 7 1 9   
Informal (female) 4 10 15 29   
Total 38 171 307 516   
       
*only wage workers †only secondary/higher graduates ‡ only skilled workers who acquired their skill outside of schooling 
 
                                                
87 A surprisingly constant proportion of 25% across employment groups report being unskilled. This was only lower for 
formal, public-sector female employees, at 13%, and higher for informally employed females, at 43%. 
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Overall, despite the mixing, it is clear that there is a tendency toward either extensive 
formal education and training for formal employment, or informal qualification toward 
informal employment. This divergence will become important again below. 
Differentiation between formal and informal on-the-job training is only possible by 
reviewing job history, and this, in turn, is the focus of Table 3. The data on previous 
employment status show that prior to the current job, 25% of the sample was in another 
waged job, 1% were employers or self-employed, 3% were unpaid family workers, 17% were 
unemployed, 34% were full-time students, and the remaining 19% were temporary workers, 
housewives (relevant only to the female sample), or in another status. This distribution shows 
that most wage workers in the sample are in their first waged job, meaning that on-the-job 
training is likely to have occurred mostly in the current job. Among those who previously 
held some form of employment, however, most (85%) were in informal or non-waged jobs. 
 There is a surprising degree of mobility between formal and informal employment. In 
fact, 48% of previously employed formal public employees and 61% of formal private 
employees had held informal jobs prior to the current job. This movement seems to be 
unidirectional, however; only 3.5% of informal employees who had been previously 
employed had held formal jobs.88 Furthermore, of the entire sample, females are again 
underrepresented, at only 11% of previously employed individuals. This seems to confirm 
that young women are less mobile in the urban labor market than men89. 
 
Table 3 –  Job history and job search mechanisms     
       
Employment status before current job:*      
 Wage worker Employer/self-emp. Unpaid family work Unemployed. Full-time student Temp/houswif/oth. 
Formal, pub (male) 55 3 10 37 58 41 
Formal, prv (male) 80 4 8 49 65 58 
Informal (male) 215 11 32 71 267 149 
Formal, pub (fem.) 25 - - 45 65 21 
Formal, prv (fem.) 8 - - 33 21 11 
Informal (female) 17 - - 31 58 23 
Total 400 18 50 266 534 303 
       
Sector/formality of previous job:º      
 Formal public Formal private Informal Non-wage Total   
Formal, pub (male) 14 6 35 13 68   
Formal, prv (male) 2 21 57 12 92   
Informal (male) 3 4 208 43 258   
Formal, pub (fem.) 12 3 10 0 25   
Formal, prv (fem.) 2 2 4 0 8   
Informal (female) 0 3 14 0 17   
Total 33 39 328 68 468   
                                                
88 A test using the panel dimension of the data, i.e. comparing formally and informally employed youth in 1998 and 2006, 
shows that over the 8-year period, 21% of informal employees had moved to formal employment, and only 4% of formal 
employees had become informal. This movement is higher than that attained for the entire sample in previous survey, such as 
Wahba and Mokhtar, 2002, who found only 11% of non-contract-holders and 3.5% of contract-holders changing their 
contract status between 1990 and 1998. Most of this is likely due to the greater mobility of new labor market entrants.  
89 Again, this result has been derived by Assaad and Arntz, 2005, who use constrained mobility to describe part of the male-
female wage differential. While their focus is geographic, the data here show a lack of movement between jobs by women. 
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Means of finding current job (more than one response per person possible):*    
 Government facil. Application/inquiry Friends/relatives Direct contact Newspaper ads Private office 
Formal, pub (male) 87 64 50 20 29 4 
Formal, prv (male) 40 74 113 53 38 9 
Informal (male) 3 106 356 385 42 1 
Formal, pub (fem.) 93 34 19 12 11 0 
Formal, prv (fem.) 8 32 28 6 13 3 
Informal (female) 2 27 64 46 10 1 
Total 233 337 630 522 143 18 
       
*only wage workers  º only previously employed wage workers 
 
Before moving on to job characteristics, further results regarding “means of finding 
current job” provide a look at the differences between formal and informal job search 
mechanisms. A rather striking first result is the use of friends and relatives to find the current 
job across the board; 40-50% of males and females in informal and private formal 
employment found their job through friends and relatives, while 12% of females and 25% of 
males in formal public sector jobs used such means. Clearly, family and friends are an 
important help in finding employment, even in the public sector. Government facilitation – in 
the form of job competitions and government employment offices – plays a large role for 
public employment and, not surprisingly, a much more limited role in private employment, 
where the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration may also place individuals, but 
does so with less frequency. Overall, direct contacts – a category which includes contact with 
employers and contractors as well as waiting at gathering locations – are equally or more 
important than job applications or newspaper ads, especially for informal employment. 
Access to informal jobs is shown to be highly network-dependent, a characteristic also 
present in the other sectors but more important for informal employment. 
 
Working Conditions 
A final area of descriptive analysis is working conditions, where a clear question is the 
nature and scope of differences between formal (public and private) and informal 
employment. A summary is shown in Table 4, including stability of employment, working 
hours, monthly wage, hourly wage, and place of employment. To provide a means of 
comparison, the non-wage group (employers, self-employed, and unpaid family workers) has 
been reintroduced where data is available. 
 
Table 4 –  Employment Conditions      
       
Stability of employment:      
 Permanent Temporary Seasonal Casual Total  
Formal, pub (male) 178 26 - - 204  
Formal, prv (male) 213 45 1 5 264  
Informal (male) 412 173 2 158 745  
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Non-wage (male) 384 9 - 10 403  
Formal, pub (fem.) 116 40 - - 156  
Formal, prv (fem.) 56 17 - - 73  
Informal (female) 67 58 - 4 129  
Non-wage (female) 226 3 - 1 230  
Total 1,042 359 3 167 2,204  
       
Member of a trade union:   Medical insurance:   
 Yes No   Yes No Total 
Formal, pub (male) 102 102  172 32 204 
Formal, prv (male) 80 184  89 175 264 
Informal (male) 13 732  3 742 745 
Non-wage (male) 15 388  6 397 403 
Formal, pub (fem.) 81 75  120 36 156 
Formal, prv (fem.) 22 51  29 44 73 
Informal (female) 3 126  0 129 129 
Non-wage (female) 1 229  2 228 230 
Total 317 1,887  421 1,783 2,204 
       
Hours per week:      
 Mean hours Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Observations  
Formal, pub (male) 47.62 12.65 21 108 204  
Formal, prv (male) 54.36 12.89 0 102 264  
Informal (male) 53.82 15.78 5 114 745  
Non-wage (male) 52.33 19.40 2 105 403  
Formal, pub (fem.) 40.13 10.26 2 72 156  
Formal, prv (fem.) 47.53 14.68 3 90 73  
Informal (female) 54.96 16.23 6 84 129  
Non-wage (female) 11.20 12.80 1 72 230  
Whole sample 47.48 20.06 0 114 2,204  
       
Monthly wage:*      
 Mean wage (LE) Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Observations  
Formal, pub (male) 889.27 3417.25 99 46,830 204  
Formal, prv (male) 792.95 1190.88 80 11,500 264  
Informal (male) 411.02 281.50 0 3,900 736  
Formal, pub (fem.) 400.08 412.40 37 3,120 156  
Formal, prv (fem.) 458.88 418.88 80 2,400 73  
Informal (female) 253.15 390.28 0 3,120 129  
Whole sample 526.14 1369.601 0 46,830 1,562  
       
*only wage workers      
 
As can be expected, most formal employment – whether public or private – is of a 
permanent nature; temporary employment relationships are extant in public and private 
formal employment, but are much more common for informal workers. Casual employment is 
almost universally a domain of informally employed males. Almost all non-wage workers are 
permanently employed, as they or their families own the business in which they work. 
Membership in a trade union is much more common – though never more common than 50% 
– in formal employment, which likely has to do with the state dominance of trade unions in 
Egypt.90 Medical is available for a majority of formal public sector workers, and about one 
third of formal private workers. On the other hand, both trade union membership and sick 
leave are very uncommon for the informally employed.91 
                                                
90 Again, see Assaad, 1993 
91 The only exceptions – i.e. informal employees with union membership or medical insurance – are private informal 
workers. No public informal workers have these benefits, again supporting the conclusion of informal employment in the 
public sector. The statistics for sick leave and vacation leave mirror medical insurance. 
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Large differences between formal and informal employment are found in working hours 
and wages. Informal and private-sector employees in the sample work much longer on 
average than their formally employed counterparts in the public sector; the difference is 
greatest for women, where formal public sector workers have 40 hours weekly, formal private 
workers 47.5, and informal employees an average of 55 hours per week (with increasing 
variance). Non-wage females – most of whom are family workers – work much less, at 11 
hours per week on average, showing the use of women’s unpaid labor as a supplemental labor 
supply alongside household responsibilities. Males in non-waged, informal, and formal 
private-sector employment work 52-54 hours per week (against 47 hours in the public sector); 
informal and non-waged workers show greater variance. 
These differences in working hours are dwarfed by the gaps in monthly and hourly wages 
between employment groups. While male formal public-sector workers earn LE 890 per 
month,92 and male formal private-sector workers earn LE 793, informally employed males 
earn an average of LE 411, less than half of the public sector wage. This is still higher than 
the average wage for female formal public-sector employees (LE 400), and while the formal 
private sector wage is somewhat higher for females (LE 459), the wage for informal 
employees is a mere LE 253, exactly half of the overall sample average. While especially 
formal public and private sector wage distributions among males show an extremely high 
skewness – with maximum values over 52 times greater than the average – this shows very 
high wage differentials between groups. Explaining these differentials – and the extent that 
they have to do with qualification differences or wage premia – requires multivariate 
regression analysis. To control for differences in working hours, this will use hourly wages. 
 
Summary of the findings 
In summary, the descriptive statistics deliver the following background facts about urban 
labor markets for youth, which provide further insight about the nature of formal and informal 
employment and modes of qualification and undergird the following analysis:  
1) With the labor contract and social insurance definition, an indicator for informal 
employment can be derived, which overlaps some with government and public 
enterprise employment. Most private employees are informally employed. 
2) Females are underrepresented across the sample, and especially among employers 
and self-employed, and those with previous job experience. The only segments with 
an even balance of females and males are government employment and unpaid family 
work, where women are a slight majority. 
                                                
92 This amounts to US$ 165 at current exchange rates and US $564 at purchasing power parity (source: www.xe.com, market 
exchange rate for Aug. 1, 2008; World Bank, 2007 World Development data). 
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3) There is an apparent educational dichotomy between formal and informal employees, 
whereby most university graduates are employed formally – in the public or private 
sectors – and most vocational school graduates and those with lower education levels 
are employed informally. Illiterates appear to be employed formally more often than 
primary and preparatory school graduates. 
4) Informal employees were much more likely to use informal modes of qualification 
such as the traditional apprenticeship and on-the-job training with a craftsman. Some 
of those who had trained to craftsman level were formally employed. 
5) Most urban wage workers under 30 were still in their first job after leaving school or 
unemployment. Of those who had been previously employed, most had been 
informally employed or non-wage-workers. There is a unidirectional mobility from 
informal to formal employment. 
6) Informal employees are more likely to use facilitation by relatives and friends or 
direct contacts to find employment – modes present in formal employment, as well. 
7) Working conditions between formal and informal employment – i.e. working hours 
and wages – are strikingly different. Without controlling for qualification differences, 
formal public-sector male employees earn twice the monthly wage of male employees 
and 3.5 times that of informal female employees, with great variance. 
 
An empirical model will help get at how the variation is related to qualification measures, and 
help derive stronger results for theoretical discussion. 
 
V. Empirical Model and Regression Results 
Answers on the returns to qualification measures can be delivered, as in the human 
capital literature, through multivariate wage regressions. Here, a standard Oaxaca-Blinder 
model of wage decomposition with Mincerian human capital and experience terms is used.93 
The assumption underlying this model is that market wages can be explained through 
productivity-related characteristics from schooling, on-the-job training, and other 
qualification mechanisms, and non-productivity-related factors such as place of residence 
(due to regional differences in the cost of living or productivity), gender (due to gender 
discrimination or gender-specific characteristics), age (due to seniority pay not tied to 
experience) or family background (to control for social differences). The functional form used 
here is as follows: 
 
  ln(y) =  α + βX + γexp + δexp2 + ζN + ε 
 
where y is hourly wage (used logarithmically to derive marginal results), X is a vector of 
human capital characteristics, exp is current experience, with a squared term to control for 
diminishing returns over time, N measures various non-productivity related variables and ε is 
                                                
93 Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973; Mincer, 1974. These papers generally serve as the basis for wage regressions, a large body of 
literature which is summarized neatly in, e.g., Borjas, 2008. The same model is used in Assaad, 1996; Wahba, 2000, and Said 
and El-Hamidi, 2005, as mentioned above. 
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a normally distributed error term with a mean or zero. The variable exp is defined (initially) 
as years since labor market entry; possibilities for differentiating between formal and informal 
experience are introduced below. X is made up primarily of dummy variables separating the 
various levels of education and means of skill attainment, while N includes standard terms 
such as geographic dummies (here, defined at the macro-level of region) and, importantly, 
sex. Occupation can be introduced, using fixed effects to control for occupation-specific 
characteristics such as occupational risk.94 Initial specifications will use sectoral and formality 
dummies, while later specifications will separate by gender, sector, and formality. 
There is a strong case for selection bias among the data, as the choice of entry into formal 
or informal employment is non-random and very likely correlated with unobservable worker-
specific effects such as ability and job preference, as well as the partially observable 
characteristic of socioeconomic background.95 Put more precisely, it could be that more able 
individuals, or those that place a high value on social protection, choose jobs in formal 
employment, while less able or more “individualistic” workers decide to work informally. If 
the two groups are highly diverse – a likely condition – then consistent estimations may be 
difficult or impossible. Estimated differences in returns to qualification may be skewed. 
One previously used alleviant to the selection issue is a two-stage Heckman correction, 
where the propensity to enter informal employment is predicted in the first stage with a 
probabilistic selection model, and taken as a “lambda” term in the second-stage wage 
regression.96 Such a selection model could be defined as: 
 
  p(formal) =  Φ(α + βX + ζN + ηP + ε) 
 
such that Φ(·) is an inverse cumulative distribution (probit) function, X and N are the same 
vectors on qualification and individual characteristics as before, and P is a vector of predictor 
variables which are correlated with the formality decision but not wage.97 This can be inserted 
into the wage decomposition, with λ=p(formal), such that: 
 
  ln(y) =  α + βX + γexp + δexp2 + ζN + θλ + ε 
 
While this selection equation presents a possibility for correction, the first-stage selection 
must accurately predict formality of employment, and have at least one strong (instrumental) 
variable in vector P which is not included in the wage equation. This is a very difficult task. If 
the individual is married, it can be estimated that formality would be more important due to, 
                                                
94 An example would be heavy machinery work, which standard theory would suggest to be compensated with higher wages. 
As will be seen below, however, the rationale for occupational dummies is more of a practical than a theoretical nature. 
95 It seems likely that certain population segments are much more likely to take up informal work. 
96 For the original discussion of this, see Heckman, 1979. For selection bias in a very similar context, see Assaad, 1996. 
97 The α, β, ζ, and ε terms used in the selection equation are not the same as those estimated in the wage decomposition. 
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for example, the advantages of medical insurance for one’s spouse or children98; yet marriage 
is also known to influence wages, as will be seen below. Assaad (1996) includes father’s and 
mother’s educational status, with the assumption that individuals with educated parents are 
more likely to be formal, yet parents’ education is also likely to be correlated with innate 
ability – and it is not consistently available in the 2006 data. Available information on an 
individual’s first job can help generate a “formality of first job” variable, yet this will 
correspond exactly to formality status for all individuals who are currently still in their first 
job. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the results of the selection equation for the whole 
sample and for males and females separately using various specifications. It is worth noting 
that with repeated tests, none of the predicted probabilities from these equations had a 
significant coefficient in the second-stage equations. 
As such, the question of how two identical individuals would earn in a formal vs. 
informal job is extremely difficult to determine from the existing data and model. The altered 
question of how the same individual has earned in different sectors can be analyzed, using the 
panel dimension of the data.99 Indeed, the data include 360 individuals (285 males and 75 
females) who were employed as wage workers in both 1998 and 2006. By comparing these 
individuals’ wages – correcting for inflation and wage growth – we can obtain an indication 
of whether the results are consistent. The model, using year and individual fixed effects, is: 
 
  ln(y/inf) =  α + βX + γexp + δexp2 + θN + fei + feyr + ε 
 
where inf is the yearly Consumer Price Index deflator, fei and feyr are fixed effects terms for 
individual and year, and all other variables are the same. Most variables in vector N will have 
to be dropped, however, as these are invariant for the individual over time. Further, the model 
only applies to those individuals who participated in the survey in both years and changed 
employment status – which itself is unlikely to be a randomly selected sample. It can 
nonetheless help obtain more consistent results than the simple static regressions.  
 
Aggregated regression analysis and results 
Table 5 shows the results of the initial round of OLS wage equations. Stars indicate the 
90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) significance levels, with t-scores in parentheses to the 
right. The base case in all regressions is an individual who is illiterate, unskilled, in the 
private sector, and in Cairo, as well as male in specifications (1) through (4). 
                                                
98 Marriage and status as household head are used as determinants of the formality decision in Marcouiller et al., 1997. 
99 This is similar to Badaoui et al., 2007, who attempt to calculate the formal/informal wage gap in South Africa using both 
panel data and propensity score matching (PSM). Their analysis is strengthened by the availability of more than two periods. 
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The results of the regressions are, at first glance, congruent with human capital theory. 
Higher education level wages lead to significantly higher wages across the board, as do 
experience (with a negative quadratic term) and the range of job-relevant skills. One result in 
the education coefficients is quite surprising, however. For all youth, primary school actually 
entails – all else equal – lower wages than illiteracy, and there is no statistically significant 
benefit for preparatory, general secondary, or vocational secondary education. In fact, 
vocational education has an insignificant negative coefficient, which is similar regardless of 
subject. Returns to formal education in the results only become visible at the university and 
post-graduate levels, though here they are substantial: a 4-year university graduate can expect 
to earn 22% more than an illiterate with the same characteristics, a 5-year graduate will earn 
75% more, and a post-graduate degree holder will earn 140% more.100 This is yet stronger for 
males, as seen in specification (5). When education is defined by years of schooling,101 the 
coefficient is negative with a positive coefficient for the quadratic term. This again supports 
the notion of increasing returns to education. While this result is unusual in the human capital 
literature, it has been found in a handful of other countries.102 
The returns to experience, meanwhile, are closer to expectations; in the whole sample and 
for males, there is a significant 3-6% return on work experience, with significant diminishing 
returns. The level of these returns is lower when age is taken into account, as in specifications 
(1) and (2), and higher when age is dropped; it is difficult to know the extent to which the 
effect has to do with actual on-the-job experience vs. seniority pay. This work experience can 
be divided into work experience in formal and informal employment by using previous job 
characteristics and start dates, in order to distinguish between the on-the-job training in both. 
Interestingly, both types of experience remain highly significant, and informal experience 
appears to have a slightly higher return of 4% (as against 3% for formal experience). This will 
be returned to below. 
 
Table 5 –  Aggregated OLS wage regressions    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     Males Females 
Education             
Read/write -0.085 (-0.83)   -0.043 (-0.42) 
Primary school -0.169** (-2.27) -0.135* (-1.90)   
0.063 
-0.017 
(0.57) 
(-0.20) -0.154** (-2.00) 
-0.422 
-0.161 
(-1.07) 
(-0.65) 
Preparatory school -0.106 (-1.17) -0.098 (-1.08)   0.067 (0.65) -0.094 (-1.01) 0.141 (0.50) 
General sec. ed. 0.074 (0.40) 0.099 (0.54)   0.315 (1.62) 0.131 (0.71) 0.797 (1.11) 
Voc. sec. – agr. -0.177 (-1.44)   -0.065 (-0.51) 
Voc. sec. – ind. -0.080 (-1.14) 
-0.081 (-1.22) 
  
-0.015 
0.101 
(-0.11) 
(1.21) 0.001 (0.01) 
-0.303 
0.234 
(-0.89) 
(1.14) 
                                                
100 Marginal effects derived with e^(.564) and e^(.893), assuming dummies=1.  
101 The procedure for defining years of schooling is the same as used in Wahba, 2000, whereby illiterate = 0 years of 
schooling, read and write = 3 years, primary = 6, etc. Because there is perfect multicollinearity between this variable and the 
educational dummies, it is not possible to include both attainment level and years of school, as in Said and El-Hamidi, 2005. 
102 Wahba, 2000, cites studies on the Sudan, Malaysia, and Taiwan which show similar increasing returns to education. 
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Voc. sec. – com. -0.097 (-1.30)     0.110 (1.20) -0.009 (-0.11) -0.103 (-0.65) 
Voc. sec. – 5yr. -0.051 (-0.20)   -0.397 (-0.89) 0.002 (0.01) 
Post-secondary 0.020 (0.21) 0.029 (0.31)   
0.219 
0.218* 
(0.67) 
(1.94) 0.179* (1.71) -0.030 (-0.14) 
University – 4yr. 0.199** (2.55)   0.397*** (4.81) 0.110 (0.71) 
University – 5yr. 0.564*** (3.95) 0.308*** (4.29)   0.766*** (4.79) 0.376 (1.30) 
Post-graduate 0.893*** (3.27) 1.002*** (3.68)   
0.377*** 
0.811** 
0.942*** 
(3.73) 
(2.42) 
(3.07) 1.764*** (3.98) 0.534 (1.41) 
Years of education     -0.031* (-1.92)       
Years of educ2     0.003*** (3.27)       
             
Work experience             
Experience 0.031** (2.13)   0.041*** (2.77)   0.058*** (3.88) -0.023 (-0.62) 
Experience2 -0.001* (-1.76)   -0.001 (-1.22)   -0.002*** (-2.61) 0.004* (1.73) 
Exper. – formal   0.034* (1.95)   0.047** (2.50)     
Exper. – formal2   -0.002* (-1.87)   -0.002 (-1.42)     
Exper. – informal   0.040** (2.58)   0.047*** (2.87)     
Exper. – informal2   -0.002** (-2.09)   -0.001 (-1.49)     
             
Skills acquired             
Regular schooling 0.182*** (3.46) 0.193*** (3.68) 0.030 (0.44) 0.026 (0.38) 0.158*** (2.65) 0.238** (2.09) 
Vocational training 0.245** (2.54) 0.251*** (2.59) 0.115 (0.95) 0.120 (0.98) 0.206* (1.92) 0.364** (1.65) 
Through contractor 0.281*** (2.59) 0.293*** (2.70) 0.181 (1.41) 0.169 (1.31) 0.304*** (2.88) --- --- 
Through craftsman 0.268*** (5.31) 0.271*** (5.36) 0.125* (1.71) 0.104 (1.40) 0.266*** (5.13) 0.248 (1.40) 
Courses/other 0.168*** (2.93) 0.168*** (2.93) 0.057 (0.84) 0.045 (0.65) 0.150** (2.45) 0.253* (1.74) 
             
Sector/job status             
Formal? 0.187*** (3.74) 0.229*** (3.17) 0.133** (2.35) 0.151* (1.81) 0.192*** (3.54) 0.323*** (2.69) 
Trade union? 0.268*** (4.94) 0.288*** (5.33) 0.254*** (4.02) 0.244*** (3.83) 0.264*** (4.20) 0.291*** (2.68) 
Medical insurance? 0.284*** (4.80) 0.281*** (4.73) 0.260*** (3.81) 0.277*** (4.02) 0.215*** (3.13) 0.429*** (3.54) 
Government -0.242*** (-4.00) -0.251*** (-4.15) -0.296*** (-3.87) -0.286*** (-3.73) -0.272*** (-3.67) -0.185* (-1.66) 
Public enterprise -0.040 (-0.49) -0.027 (-0.34) -0.144 (-1.55) -0.134 (-1.43) 0.008 (0.09) -0.103 (-0.49) 
Outside of establ. 0.405*** (8.25) 0.397*** (8.07) 0.275* (1.93) 0.194** (2.09) 0.347*** (7.18) 2.041*** (5.64) 
Joint venture 0.340*** (2.84) 0.346*** (2.87) 1.178* (1.91) 0.282** (1.96) 0.368*** (3.02) -0.196 (-0.47) 
Foreign 1.035** (2.25) 0.982** (2.13) 0.620 (0.88) 1.180* (1.91) 1.307** (2.10) 0.813 (1.15) 
Other -0.046 (-0.12) -0.022 (-0.06) 0.133** (2.35) 0.628 (0.88) -0.037 (-0.10) --- --- 
             
Personal char.             
Female -0.288*** (-5.98) -0.291*** (-6.17) -0.224*** (-3.97) -0.230*** (-4.03) --- --- --- --- 
Married 0.144*** (2.59) 0.146*** (2.63) 0.116*** (2.70) 0.119*** (2.75) 0.107** (2.48) 0.204** (2.16) 
HH Head -0.018 (-0.28) -0.026 (-0.42)         
Age 0.020*** (2.83) 0.021*** (2.91)         
             
Region             
Alex./Canal Cities -0.061 (-1.24) -0.071 (-1.46) -0.094* (-1.68) -0.094* (-1.68) -0.016 (-0.30) -0.237** (-2.12) 
Upper Egypt -0.155*** (-3.27) -0.156 (-3.30) -0.169*** (-3.19) -0.166*** (-3.12) -0.104** (-2.02) -0.355*** (-3.18) 
Lower Egypt -0.085* (-1.84) -0.091 (-1.98) -0.135** (-2.64) -0.138*** (-2.65) -0.071 (-1.40) -0.230** (-2.10) 
             
Constant -0.392** (-2.60) -0.447*** (-2.92) 0.140 (1.38) 0.054 (0.50) -0.101 (-1.10) -0.993*** (-2.67) 
Occupational fe’s? No No yes yes no no 
Observations 1,557 1,557 1,557 1,557 1,201 356 
R2 0.3028 0.2963 0.5211 0.5249 0.2698 0.4217 
 
Skill variables – dummies which record whether the individual reported having a skill, 
and where this was acquired – generally have large, significant, and positive coefficients, with 
the largest and most significant effects for those who learned their skill through a contractor 
or craftsman. This seems to show the strength of the institution of the traditional 
apprenticeship and informal skills training, which adds as much as 35% to wages. Skills seem 
to be unique to particular occupations, however, since controlling for occupations causes all 
coefficients – with the exception of craftsman training – to become insignificant. 
These effects are made more accurate by controlling for personal, job-related, and 
geographic variables, which deliver interpretable effects of their own. The strongest 
differences are seen in the sector, job status, and gender results, which in these specifications 
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are still treated together. In every estimation, formality brings with it a significantly higher 
wage, on the order of 15-25%, with a much higher effect (38%) for women. When controlling 
for occupation, the effect is smaller, implying that part of the differential may have to do with 
occupation – some of which are more likely than others to be formal. Government 
employment seems to have a pay disadvantage relative to private employment, while public 
enterprises show no significant difference to private work. It should be cautioned that this is 
an effect which does not price in public sector fringe benefits. The positive pay differentials 
for joint ventures and foreign establishments – both of which had small samples – are not 
unusual,103 but the strongly positive effect of working outside an establishment is quite 
surprising. Unionization has a rather strong and significant wage effect, as does medical 
insurance. This result is also surprising, as a competitive labor market should include 
compensating wage differentials which lower the wage of an insured individual by the value 
of a social benefit.104 The fact that medical insurance signals a higher wage implies an 
uncompetitive market and job rents – a condition requiring theoretical explanation. 
Across the sample, the wage disadvantage for females’ employment is at least 25%; in 
the separate male and female equations the constant term for female employment is .9 log 
points lower. It appears that informally employed females have an even higher wage 
differential to males than formally employed females. The other coefficients show a clear 
divergence from men in the lack of significant differences between educational levels once 
job characteristics have been taken into account. While part of this due to small sample size, it 
may also be that the unusually strong effects of formality, skill level, union membership, 
marriage, etc., catch and negate the effects of education. The regional corrections are also 
much stronger for women, raising the possibility that young women have a more difficult 
position in locales outside of Cairo – especially Upper Egypt – where discrimination may be 
stronger. With the strength of these effects, a much higher r2 value is possible for women, 
showing that 42% of the variance in log wages can be explained, vs. only 27% for men. 
With the large differentials between males, females, and employment groups in mind, the 
next section will disaggregate the sample by gender, sector, and formality and compare the 
effects of qualification in each of the six resulting samples. 
 
                                                
103 Numerous authors, including te Velde and Morissey, 2003, have shown that foreign employers in developing countries 
tend to pay higher wages. It is instructive that both individuals in the sample in foreign employment are formal and have 
medical insurance. 
104 Again, see Assaad, 1996. This issue was the key thrust of Assaad’s analysis. 
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Gender, sector, and formality-separated wage analysis and results 
This section separates samples by gender and employment status (formal public, formal 
private, and informal private), creating six sets of wage regressions. This has its justification 
in that wage setting mechanisms may be vastly different between sectors (with particularly 
rigid rules in public employment) and that only a separate analysis can return results on 
individual returns. While the choice of division can be criticized, the empirical results above 
have proven that it is sensible to segregate gender and government vs. private employment; 
the separate treatment of informal employment allows analysis of the returns to formal, para-
formal, and informal qualification mechanisms in formal vs. informal employment.105 
The results are listed in Table 6. Using a specification similar to (4) from Table 6, but 
without controlling for occupation due to the smaller sample sizes, estimations (1) through (6) 
show the effects of the various qualification mechanisms for each employment group. 
Because various sectors are still present in each sample, these have been left in the 
regressions. The base case in (1) and (4) is government employment, and private employment 
in (2), (3), (5), and (6). 
 
Table 6 –  OLS wage regressions by sector, gender, and formality    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Formal, pub., mal Formal, priv., male Informal, male Formal, pub., fem. Formal, priv., fem. Informal, female 
Education             
Read/write -0.949 (-1.04) 0.409 (1.34) -0.021 (-0.21) --- --- --- --- -0.197 (-0.45) 
Primary school -0.590 (-1.21) -0.216 (-0.90) -0.047 (-0.60) --- --- -0.283 (-0.19) 0.236 (0.79) 
Preparatory school -0.786** (-2.06) -0.198 (-0.62) 0.010 (0.10) --- --- 0.708 (0.52) 0.429 (1.01) 
General sec. ed. -0.401 (-0.49) 0.137 (0.26) 0.234 (1.22) --- --- --- --- 0.659 (0.91) 
Voc. sec. – agr. -0.434 (-0.81) 0.209 (0.59) -0.126 (-0.91) -1.045** (-2.08) --- --- 0.307 (0.71) 
Voc. sec. – ind. -0.561** (-2.05) -0.082 (-0.36) 0.103 (1.21) 0.710’ (1.80) 0.555 (0.40) 0.373 (1.30) 
Voc. sec. – com. -0.593* (-1.90) -0.177 (-0.69) 0.078 (0.81) -0.271 (-1.15) 0.541 (0.42) 0.124 (0.51) 
Voc. sec. – 5yr. -0.836 (-1.38) --- --- --- --- -0.213 (-0.59) --- --- --- --- 
Post-secondary -0.085 (-0.28) 0.189 (0.63) 0.085 (0.63) -0.318 (-1.04) 0.282 (0.20) 0.554* (1.70) 
University – 4yr. -0.155 (-0.61) 0.537** (2.28) 0.348*** (2.93) -0.181 (-0.96) 0.693 (0.49) 0.305 (1.06) 
University – 5yr. 0.163 (0.42) 0.936*** (3.02) 0.590* (1.75) 0.151 (0.45) 0.595 (0.37) --- --- 
Post-graduate 0.123 (0.15) 2.925*** (4.20) --- --- 0.163 (0.32) -0.674 (-0.25) 0.827* (1.91) 
             
Work experience             
Exper. – formal 0.105* (1.80) 0.129*** (3.03) 0.050 (1.04) -0.081 (-0.94) -0.200* (-1.75) 0.199 (0.81) 
Exper. – formal2 -0.006 (-1.23) -0.010*** (-3.46) -0.002 (-0.83) 0.011 (1.37) 0.014* (1.69) -0.021 (-0.97) 
Exper. – informal 0.115* (1.68) 0.093** (2.02) 0.043** (2.37) -0.125 (-0.86) 0.064 (0.09) -0.010 (-0.17) 
Exper. – informal2 -0.006 (-1.60) -0.005** (-2.28) -0.001 (-1.60) 0.004 (0.59) 0.039** (1.66) 0.003 (0.71) 
             
Skills acquired             
Regular schooling 0.092 (0.59) 0.080 (0.66) 0.167** (1.99) 0.024 (0.13) 0.455 (1.15) 0.445** (2.56) 
Vocational training 0.428* (1.67) 0.259 (1.19) -0.055 (-0.34) 0.034 (0.07) 0.610 (0.95) -0.080 (-0.19) 
Through contractor -0.372 (-0.39) 0.375 (0.56) 0.291*** (2.93) --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Through craftsman -0.055 (-0.16) 0.189 (1.26) 0.292*** (5.48) --- --- 1.093 (1.18) 0.237** (2.05) 
Courses/other 0.373 (1.46) 0.145 (1.08) 0.132* (1.92) 0.021 (0.05) 0.479 (1.01) 0.310* (1.76) 
             
Sector/job status             
Trade union? 0.229* (1.67) 0.192* (1.84) 0.423** (2.49) 0.181 (1.41) 0.382 (1.05) 0.895* (1.66) 
Medical insurance? 0.176 (1.02) 0.230** (2.32) -0.236 (-0.70) 0.447*** (2.85) 0.343 (1.15) --- --- 
Government     -0.555** (-1.98)   --- --- -0.271 (-0.83) 
Public enterprise 0.285** (2.07)   0.049 (0.27) 0.161 (0.75) --- --- -0.584 (-0.84) 
                                                
105 Other divisions of the sample – including along medical insurance, union, or occupational lines – were tried but showed 
less clarity than the division by formality and sector. An empirical test for the division of the labor market into multiple 
segments, as described in Günther und Launov, 2006, could offer more formal empirical justification, but was not attempted.  
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Outside establ.   0.219 (1.45) 0.363*** (7.62)   --- --- 2.041*** (5.67) 
Joint venture   0.384** (2.49) 0.171 (0.74)   -0.037 (-0.05) -0.186 (-0.27) 
Foreign   1.316* (1.99) --- ---   0.463 (0.49) --- --- 
Other   0.282 (0.42) 0.076 (0.19)   --- --- --- --- 
             
Personal char.             
Married 0.106 (0.50) -0.038 (-0.23) 0.090 (0.95) 0.328** (2.52) 0.101 (0.37) 0.124 (0.57) 
HH Head -0.152 (-0.70) 0.229 (1.32) 0.057 (0.59) -0.689 (-1.38) --- --- --- --- 
Age .002 (0.07) -0.017 (-0.77) 0.013 (1.42) 0.029 (0.95) 0.028 (0.42) 0.032 (1.43) 
             
Region             
Alex./Canal Cities -0.068 (-0.37) 0.028 (0.24) -0.033 (-0.50) -0.297* (-1.72) -0.214 (-0.65) -0.237 (-1.38) 
Upper Egypt -0.240 (-1.46) -0.009 (-0.07) -0.086 (-1.41) -0.401** (-2.07) -0.263 (-0.69) -0.429*** (-2.73) 
Lower Egypt -0.189 (-1.25) -0.113 (-0.89) -0.040 (-0.68) -0.451*** (-2.65) 0.131 (0.38) -0.032 (-0.17) 
             
Constant 0.410 (1.21) 0.340 (0.68) -0.429** (-2.48) -.209     (-0.27) -0.925 (-0.52) -1.255*** (-2.79) 
Observations 204 264 745 156 73 129 
R2 0.2259 0.3575 0.2415 0.3919 0.3746 0.4766 
 
As can be expected, the education coefficients are much weaker across samples – both 
due to the smaller sample size, and selection. As was shown above, more educated individuals 
– whether male or female – are more likely to enter formal employment, especially in the 
public sector, meaning that there is a preponderance of these individuals in (1), (2), (4), and 
(5). In the public sector – shown in (1) and (4) – the seeming lack of returns to education 
could be due to the fact that entry to the public sector itself is a return to education. Put 
differently, more schooling may not lead to a higher wage in a public job because it primarily 
leads to a better chance at a public job. The pattern of higher returns to education in formal 
public employment is not confirmed, when selection is not taken into account.106 Skills 
acquired in vocational training bring a significant return to formal public sector males, but not 
to females, while informal qualification mechanisms do not seem to be rewarded. 
In the private sector, the returns to formal education are much higher, though they are 
only significant for males; especially university and post-graduate education are rewarded. 
Formal and informal experience also show high, significant returns, although the inverted 
pattern of increasing returns to formal experience is again observable for females. The skills 
variables are positive but not significant. 
The results of interest to this analysis are found in specifications (3) and (6), where 
informal wages for males and females are disaggregated. These equations also show returns to 
education, yet a much higher pattern of returns to informal qualification mechanisms. 
Beginning with formal education, the returns to schooling for informally employed males 
show a completely flat pattern up until university and post-graduate education, where those 
males of these groups who are informally employed show large and significant wage 
advantages over their less educated informal counterparts. For females, there is a large and 
                                                
106 Again, a much stronger result could be delivered with a two-stage model, but this is not possible in the data. 
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significant premium for university education. One explanation for this is the higher 
reservation wage of these informal employees, who would be more able to find a well-paying 
formal job in the public or private sector, and thus only work informally if the wage offered 
induces them to change sectors. An undiscussed possibility is informal credentialism. 
The experience terms show the expected signs for males, but not for females; in both 
cases, they are smaller and less significant than in private formal employment, though it is 
important to note that the informal experience term is more significant for informally 
employed males. For this group, each year of informal work experience brings a 4.4% 
increase in wages, with decreasing returns, possibly while these workers become more 
skilled, gain contacts, and climb up in the small firm hierarchy. Informally employed females 
with formal employment experience seem to be compensated at 20% per year of experience, 
but the result is not significant. This finding, if valid, could also have to do with the higher 
reservation wage required to bring a formally employed female worker into an informal job. 
It is the skills terms which show the most important results. For both males and females, 
skilled work brings a premium, and especially if the skills were acquired through a contractor 
or craftsman – the marginal effect is on the order of 25-35%. While it is not possible to divide 
this further into those individuals who had trained “officially” as an apprentice (sabi) and 
those who had learned on-the-job, the distinction is likely not critical for the purpose of 
analysis. Besides the apprenticeship, other skills are important, as well, especially for young 
women. Those skills acquired through regular schooling are rewarded at 18% for males and 
56% for females. Those male workers who had learned the skill for their job through a course 
were earned 14% more, while females earned 36% more. Thus, despite the fact that the skills 
question is only a very imperfect measure for training in an apprenticeship or other informal 
institutions, these proxies for informal training can be found to have a significant effect in 
increasing earnings in informal employment. 
Across the samples, the wage premia for union membership and medical insurance are 
also still present, showing that these lead to wage differentials within employment groups, as 
well.107 Formality can still be shown to bring a premium, seen in the higher constant terms of 
the formal employment groups. The sectoral results are also as before, except that the “outside 
establishment” term seems to bring a much higher wage in informal employment. Further 
analysis reveals that this effect disappears when controlling for occupation, as most of those 
outside an establishment are bundled in the “craft and related trade workers” and “plant and 
                                                
107 The result on medical insurance is not unique to this dataset, but has been derived for industrialized countries, as well. See 
Currie and Madrian, 1999. 
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machine operators and assemblers” groups, which may capture independently operating 
craftsmen. It can be speculated that these occupations are generally more skilled, meaning 
that this sectoral variable is also catching skills variables. 
Finally, it is noticeable that the r-squared term is much lower for informally employed 
males (0.24) than for formal privately employed males (0.36), despite the lower variance in 
wages. This lends credence to existing results that such earnings are much more volatile, and 
also implies that the specification still cannot account for much of what makes up informal 
earnings – which could include ability, negotiating skills, and social contacts. For females, the 
explained variance is higher (0.47) for the informally employed, meaning that much of the 
(relatively low) variance in wages is explained by union membership, sector (whether outside 
of an establishment), the skill terms, and geography. Similar to the results in Assaad (1996), 
but using data from 18 years later, there is an indication of significantly lower wages for 
young informally employed women in Upper Egypt. 
 
Panel data regressions and individual fixed effects 
All of the results derived above could suffer from the effects of selection bias into formal 
and informal employment, which it has not been possible to solve with a two-stage correction. 
Thus, the introduction of two periods – 1998 and 2006 – with strictly the same individuals, 
can provide more robust results for comparison. By only comparing the same individuals, the 
possibilities for individual-specific differences in innate ability are excluded. Any effects 
from qualification measures, job characteristics, sectoral differences, family status or region 
will result strictly from changes in these characteristics between the two periods by one 
individual. It is not possible to measure the effects of sex, which is constant for the individual, 
or of age, which should be 8 years higher for all respondents in 2006 than in 1998.108 
Table 7 shows the results of the six regressions for the sample of strictly the same 360 
individuals.109 While it has not been possible to disaggregate by formality, sector, and gender, 
the separate specifications for the whole sample (1), males (2) and females (3), and formal 
public (4), formal private (5), and informal (6) workers can still provide a higher level of 
detail. Because 2006 employment status is used, it is also possible to record the effects of 
formality and sector for each of the employment groups for those individuals who switched 
sectors. 
                                                
108 In actuality, the difference between age in 1998 and 2006 ranged from 6 to 10 years, resulting from minor reporting error. 
It should be noted that the age definition is based on age in 1998; as such, some individuals are actually 37 or 38 in 2006. 
109 The results for the entire samples in 1998 and 2006 have also been calculated but are left out due to space constraints. 
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Table 7 –  Panel data wage regressions    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Whole sample Males Females Formal, public Formal, private Informal 
Education             
Primary/read/write -0.257 (-1.32) -0.205 (-1.03) --- --- --- --- -0.710 (-1.40) -0.081 (-0.41) 
Preparatory school -0.429* (-1.66) -0.374 (-1.37) --- --- -1.455** (-2.02) -0.329 (-0.61) -0.279 (-0.90) 
General sec. ed. --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Voc. secondary 0.020 (0.07) 0.022 (0.07) 0.496 (0.48) -1.012 (-1.43) -0.236 (-0.44) 0.580 (1.16) 
Post-secondary 0.162 (0.50) 0.149 (0.42) 0.411 (0.40) -0.876 (-1.19) -0.060 (-0.10) --- --- 
University 0.669* (1.83) 1.147*** (2.46) 0.250 (0.29) -0.575 (-0.73) 1.164* (1.72) --- --- 
Post-graduate 0.776 (1.33) 1.440** (1.96) 0.317 (0.25) -0.834 (-0.85) 1.792* (1.65) --- --- 
             
Work experience             
Exper. – formal 0.040* (1.66) 0.035 (1.22) 0.022 (0.37) 0.018 (0.48) 0.016 (0.32) 0.176 (1.13) 
Exper. – formal2 -0.001 (-1.07) -0.001 (-0.87) 0.000 (-0.09) 0.000 (0.27) -0.002 (-0.90) -0.010 (-0.81) 
Exper. – informal 0.018 (0.95) 0.025 (1.23) -0.075 (-0.83) 0.044 (0.98) -0.019 (-0.41) 0.063** (2.31) 
Exper. – informal2 -0.001 (-0.57) -0.001 (-0.77) 0.004 (0.60) -0.004 (-1.18) 0.000 (0.10) 0.000 (-0.34) 
             
Skills acquired             
Regular schooling -0.205** (-2.03) -0.139 (-1.12) -0.390** (-1.96) -0.176 (-1.28) -0.345 (-1.54) 0.012 (0.04) 
Vocational training 0.165 (0.83) 0.192 (0.89) 0.718 (0.90) 0.106 (0.29) -0.050 (-0.13) 0.073 (0.15) 
Through contractor 0.311 (1.37) 0.304 (1.31) --- --- --- --- -0.177 (-0.18) 0.405* (1.81) 
Through craftsman 0.218* (1.83) 0.223* (1.82) 1.140 (0.89) -0.068 (-0.19) 0.295 (1.10) 0.215* (1.71) 
Courses/other 0.066 (0.48) 0.102 (0.71) -0.103 (-0.13) -0.202 (-0.77) 0.505 (1.57) -0.096 (-0.45) 
             
Sector/job status             
Formal? 0.067 (0.60) 0.086 (0.71) -0.145 (-0.38) 0.369 (1.10) -0.136 (-0.74) -0.015 (-0.06) 
Union? 0.166** (1.87) 0.222** (2.09) 0.191 (1.05) 0.177* (1.74) 0.115 (0.65) 0.047 (0.10) 
Government -0.242 (-1.33) -0.396* (-1.89) 0.450 (1.01) -0.239 (-0.71) -0.295 (-0.55) -0.258 (-0.56) 
Public enterprise 0.202 (1.10) 0.188 (0.91) -0.064 (-0.13) 0.199 (0.59) 0.081 (0.17) -0.733 (-1.28) 
Outside establ. -0.209* (-1.70) -0.202 (-1.59) -0.446 (-0.51) --- --- -0.327 (-1.22) -0.134 (-0.90) 
Joint venture 0.293 (1.38) 0.281 (1.26) 0.266 (0.29) --- --- 0.307 (1.09) 0.068 (0.12) 
Foreign --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Other -0.420 (-0.90) -0.347 (-0.74) --- --- --- --- 0.080 (0.11) -1.203 (-1.36) 
             
Personal char.             
Married 0.043 (0.35) -0.007 (-0.05) 0.054 (0.18) -0.112 (-0.58) 0.216 (0.70) 0.030 (0.16) 
HH Head 0.089 (0.72) 0.147 (0.97) -0.506 (-0.93) 0.287 (1.47) 0.216 (0.71) -0.077 (-0.39) 
             
Region             
Alex./Canal Cities --- --- 0.004 (0.00) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.089 (-0.10) 
Upper Egypt --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Lower Egypt 0.036 (0.05) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
             
Survey round (yrly) 0.087*** (6.17) 0.083*** (5.38) 0.110*** (2.67) 0.102*** (4.06) 0.113*** (3.83) 0.035 (1.52) 
Constant -0.276 (-0.73) -0.284 (-0.86) -0.443 (-0.45) 0.545 (0.80) -0.005 (-0.01) -0.697** (-2.15) 
Observations 720 582 138 282 204 234 
R2 0.791 0.789 0.846 0.802 0.821 0.807 
 
 
The returns to education follow largely the same pattern as observed before, with 
increasing returns to male education and positive but non-significant effects for females, with 
the private sector seeming to reward university and post-graduate education highly. 
Experience terms are weakened in this model due to the effects of the survey round, yet again, 
formal and informal experience both seem to have a positive effect on earnings overall and in 
the public formal and informal estimations. In informal employment, formal experience 
seems to be rewarded highly, though again the effect is not significant; informal experience is 
rewarded significantly for the same individual at 6.5% per year. 
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Most importantly, the skill terms are again significant in informal employment but not in 
formal employment; training through a contractor or a craftsman brings a 53% or 25% wage 
premium, respectively. Again, this only applies to changes to the responses of one individual, 
but it shows that an individual who, between 1998 and 2006, attained a skill through a 
contractor or craftsman could expect a significantly higher wage compared to a worker 
without such a skill. In public and private formal employment, this effect cannot be found, 
although the returns to courses are high and almost significant in formal private employment. 
The divergent returns to qualification modes are, once again, observable. 
It can therefore be concluded with reasonable certainty that divergent qualification effects 
are present in the data. One effect which can no longer be proven is the formality premium, 
which is small or negative and never significant throughout the specifications. This is similar 
to the results of Badaoui et al. (2007) in South Africa, who also found that the formality term 
disappears when controlling for individual effects. Nonetheless, there are at least two reasons 
why the formal-informal differential cannot be disproved on these grounds. First, the group 
which switched formality status is non-random and, especially in informal employment, only 
consists of those individuals who had been formally employed in 1998 and left for an 
informal job; if this group had largely left voluntarily, then it would not be surprising if they 
expected the same wages as in formal employment. Those moving in the other direction could 
be especially motivated or well-connected workers who also earned well in informal 
employment, negating the formality premium. Second, it is important to note that formal 
employment, especially in the government and public enterprises, brings with it significant 
fringe benefits in housing, clothing, and medical insurance – all of which are present in the 
data but difficult to price into wages. The formal wage premium thus cannot be supported 
empirically in this model, yet it also cannot be disproved. The fact that the constant for 
estimation (6) is .7 log points lower than formal private and 1.2 log points lower than formal 
public employment implies that there still may be a large unexplained differential. 
Once again, it must be noted that because of the limited sample size, the imperfect nature 
of the formality indicator, and reporting error, particularly for earnings, all of the results still 
need to be taken with a proverbial grain of salt. Especially the effects derived previously for 
females cannot be checked, because there simply are not enough observations across both 
periods for robust results. Nonetheless, the fact that the divergent qualification trend between 
public formal, private formal and informal employment can once again be proven is strong 
support for the validity of these results. The formality premium, while not supported in the 
results, still cannot be ruled out. 
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Summary of the results 
The empirical analysis thus confirms four stylized results which must be explained 
theoretically. These are:  
1) There are higher returns to formal education and work experience in the formal 
employment, yet higher returns to informal forms of qualification such as skills 
training from a craftsman in informal employment. There is a divergence of returns to 
qualification. 
2) Informal and formal work experience have very similar returns to one another across 
employment groups; there is no clear disadvantage to informal job experience.  
3) An unexplained differential between formal and informal employment is apparent 
before controlling for individual effects; there are also strong and statistically 
significant medical insurance, gender, regional, and unionization differentials. 
4) Informal employment of males shows a high unexplained variance in wages, while 
the wages of informally employed females can be explained with higher accuracy.  
 
What is missing from the analysis is some idea of how self-employed/employers earn. 
This is not available in the data, yet almost certainly has large effects on labor market 
outcomes. For example, if informal employees tend to become employers with time and earn 
quite a bit more, then this would clearly increase the actual returns to qualification measures 
in informal employment – yet this would not show up while the individual is still informally 
employed. There is indirect evidence that there are attractive earnings potentials as an 
informal employer. From the data, it can be seen that entrance into informal employment 
remains high, despite the apparently lower absolute wages there. Also, there is anecdotal 
evidence that these workers earn well – they tend to be the main creditors in areas dominated 
by informal economic activity. While it is not available in the data, this is an important point 
which needs to be determined in future research. This point, while relevant, unfortunately 
goes beyond the bounds of what could be measured in the existing data. 
Overall, the notion that informal employment does not reward qualification can not be 
confirmed. Explaining these results theoretically is the focus of the next section. 
VI. Theoretical Discussion 
The results of the empirical work offer little support to the hypothesis that informal 
employment does not reward job qualification. Rather, the results seem to point out only that 
there is a divergence in the modes of qualification rewarded – with informal employment 
putting more weight on informal training for both males and females. This contrasts with the 
stress on higher education in formal public employment, and the importance of formal and 
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para-formal qualification modes in formal private employment. The noted differences in male 
and female returns to qualification also persist, as do a number of further trends. 
A theoretical grounding for these results is still needed, however, and all of this returns to 
the discussion of the nature of informal employment. Again, if informal jobs are a low-
productivity second-best option for those rationed out of the formal sector, then one would 
expect those with poor education to land there and not become qualified. If informal work is 
characterized merely by flexibility and free entry, and is largely competitive to formal work, 
then there could be opportunities for young people to gain on-the-job training there and use 
this as elsewhere; they may choose to enter informal employment because it offers some 
advantage over formal employment or adheres more closely to their preferences, some of 
which may not fully be expressed in wages. 
To truly understand the differences, it is necessary to analyze the formality decision and 
the effects that this may have on returns to qualification and the incentives to qualify using 
different mechanisms. The idea is that formality itself is a job characteristic resulting from 
employer-employee negotiations, but also one that is correlated with certain employment 
features, as discussed before, such as dependence on social contacts, lack of standardization, 
and higher negotiation regarding wages, and which has its own unique effects on worker 
qualification. In deriving the formality decision, it can also be speculated as to what effect this 
has on qualification incentives, deriving a result which explains the empiric results and can 
allow a discussion of the nature of labor market dualism. 
On this issue, meanwhile, it has been noticed that there is a certain amount of polarization 
of qualifications between formality and informality, which can be explained in that those 
employees expecting formal employment will choose formal and para-formal mechanisms 
(schooling, courses), while those expecting informal employment will choose others 
(apprenticeships, informal training), recognizing that this brings higher returns than the 
opposite type of qualification. Because of the firm dimensions of informal employment, such 
as low firm size and low capital intensity, a wage gap could emerge which is supported by 
path dependency of qualification. Further, because many who will eventually become 
formally employed begin in informal employment, as a means of gaining income while they 
wait for or look for formal work, they will also be included in the informal sample as a 
distinct sub-group of informal employees. While a strict division of the labor market into 
formal and informal does not apply, there are trends toward the two extremes which are 
roughly consistent with the newer theories of “dualistic dualism” in the labor market. 
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Young women have a somewhat more difficult condition in all of this: they have nearly 
equal opportunity in the public sector, somewhat less in the private formal, and very poor 
opportunity in informal employment, which is a disincentive to stay in informal work after 
marriage. Those women who are in the labor force are immobile between jobs, which creates 
an incentive for employers to train them more heavily, but also an opportunity for 
monopsonistic wage-setting, which would mean that even those employees who are skilled 
may not be fully rewarded, and the returns not evident. Outright discrimination represents a 
further factor preventing higher wages and returns to qualification. 
The following sections lead the reader through these considerations. 
 
The formality decision 
To begin, one must return to the causes of informality at an individual level. Let us 
assume that at the beginning of every new employment relationship, the decision on whether 
the worker is to receive a formal work contract and social security is bargained over anew.110 
For the employer, a work contract and social security bring two main advantages, namely a 
clear, standardized relationship with the worker and, more importantly, averting the costs of 
legal punishment for informally employing workers. The costs of formality, in turn, include 
social insurance contributions (which amount to 24/26% of gross wages up to LE 1200 for the 
employer)111 as well as the cost of minimum wage laws (stipulating a very low wage of LE 
120 per month) and paperwork. Of course, there are also social norms governing the decision 
to employ formally or informally which, if broken, could cause reputational damage. It may 
be of advantage for one employer (e.g. a large private company) to hire employees formally 
because this is the norm in the field. Smaller employers may not be expected to hire formally. 
Because of size and visibility, the risk of legal punishment will also vary between a large and 
smaller employer. Thus, there is a rift between certain firms which are more likely to hire 
informally, and others which tend to hire formally, but – if the existence of informal workers 
in public employment was any indication – there are also clear exceptions to this trend. 
Especially some otherwise formal employers find it advantageous to hire informally or to 
state lower wages (e.g. the minimum wage) on the official contract. This is one reason why it 
is difficult to distinguish between a formal and informal sector by firm. 
                                                
110 There is unlikely to be much debate over this in reality, but serves only as a first step in analysis. 
111 Up to LE 700, the rate is 26%; for the LE 500 surpassing this, the rate is 24%. See American Chamber of Commerce in 
Egypt, “Doing business in Egypt”, online at: http://www.amcham.org.eg/dbe/Labor_new.asp, accessed Jun. 6, 2008. 
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For the employee, the value of formal employment will vary to a large extent based on 
perception and household factors, as discussed briefly above.112 For example, where an 
individual is the head of a household, formal employment will bring social insurance and, if it 
is in the public sector, perhaps subsidized housing or food to the rest of the family; yet if 
another household member is already formally employed, the family may already enjoy these 
benefits, meaning that formality brings no additional benefit. Further, a formal contract may 
offer protection to an employee in the form of sick leave, vacation, or maternity leave, but 
will also cost 14% of gross wage to the employee. It has been observed that especially 
younger workers in Egypt do not value the protection of formal labor contracts highly.113 
When a worker decides on a job, the decision to seek or demand a contract with an employer 
will be influenced by these factors. If a worker has formal alternatives, it is also more likely 
that he or she will choose a formal job, while in the lack of such alternatives, informal 
employment is acceptable.114  
Parallel to the formality decision, employer and employee will come to an understanding 
on pay, average working hours, potential for bonuses, medical insurance, etc. – factors which 
have been analyzed much more extensively in labor economics.115 It is known that workers 
with a higher productivity are more likely to receive higher pay, more flexible working hours, 
performance bonuses, and insurance; formality may move along with these trends for two 
reasons. First, as stated, a worker with higher productivity is more likely to find another 
formal job, which we assume that the worker values positively. Secondly, the relative cost of 
paperwork and registration to gross wage for the employer is lower, while the probability of 
being caught or reported for employing a worker informally is higher. Thus, formality is 
likely to be one job characteristic which is likely to move “up” and “down” along with others 
like pay, medical insurance, union membership, and job stability. Formality is itself a job 
characteristic and return to qualification. 
 
The effects of the formality decision 
If formality is also an important determinant of productivity and wage setting, however, 
then the result of the formality decision will also become a cause of specific working 
conditions and wage returns to qualification. The characteristics of informal employment 
                                                
112 In the discussion of selection equations in Section V, all of these factors were mentioned, yet unusable for the selection 
equation because of their correlation with wages. Table A1 in the Appendix shows their validity as correlates with formality. 
113 Lotz, 2008; further, interviews in Cairo revealed that many younger employees were not aware of the contract 
requirement, and did not see much possible benefit from a contract. 
114 Similar to reservation wage, one could speak of reservation job conditions including formality which affect labor supply. 
115 Again, see Borjas, 2008 
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introduced in Section II are again relevant here. For example, the lack of regulatory standards 
on wage and working conditions could mean that much more of wages is up to negotiation, 
implying a wider range of outcomes dependant on relative bargaining positions. If, as argued 
by Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989), observability of effort is higher in informal 
employment than in formal employment, there will be less rationale for paying efficiency 
wages. In unpaid family employment – a regular fixture of informal employment of youth – 
the benefits accruing to work and the incentives to train or gain new skills will obviously 
function very differently and, perhaps, be more socially determined in family interactions.116 
Most importantly, the “personalized” nature of informal employment and the pre-
eminence of social contacts and networks for finding work and acquiring skills may lead to a 
strong dependence of outcomes on personal acumen and contacts, as hinted at in the case 
studies. In a highly compartmentalized informal labor market, knowing a successful employer 
or being able to establish a useful contact may be keys to greater earnings. Being part of a 
social network specializing in a particular business – such as garbage collecting in Cairo117 – 
may also be an advantage in receiving higher earnings. Just as formal employment is often 
described as having high barriers to entry, the same may be true in parts of informal labor 
markets, where the barriers are of a more socially enforced nature. Overcoming such barriers 
could also be a function of social capital. 
The evident result of these considerations is that formal and informal employment each 
reward different modes of increasing productivity through qualification. A worker in the 
formal private sector appears to be rewarded for having higher education, work experience, 
and having participated in formal courses; these certifiable means of qualification bring job-
specific skills which are of use there. Formal public sector employment seems to be made 
accessible through formal schooling, which explains why there are few returns to education 
here, but something of a negative wage differential for those with lower education. 
In informal employment, the means of qualification are different. Skills obtained may – 
due to a lack of information and standardized institutions – have to be demonstrated or 
otherwise observable. Examples would include manual skill in certain trades, which an 
employee can improve through the quality of his or her work. Other possibilities are 
qualifications which can be verified socially – for example via an intermediary (“wasta”), or 
an apprenticeship with a known master. This would explain why informal employment 
                                                
116 Dedeoglu, 2004, reports that there are highly skilled family workers in Turkey’s informal atölye, with claims by shop 
owners that training takes up to 10 years. The mechanisms for attaining these skills may be quite specialized, though. 
117 See Assaad, 1996b, for an account of the Zebbaleen (informal garbage collectors) and their attempts at maintaining their 
traditional, informal business – which is heavily network and family-based – against a formalization initiative of the state. 
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rewards informal experience and skills training through a craftsman, with a large unexplained 
component for males. The unexplained component of wages likely includes personal ability 
and acumen, negotiating ability, and membership in a social group which has access to a 
lucrative business opportunity. While investments in these areas are possible – for example 
through acquiring implicit knowledge or through social contacts acquired private – the 
investments may look very different than formal schooling or courses; these types of 
investments in human and social capital are not recordable in the existing survey evidence. 
Formal qualifications such as schooling or state certification of a trade could be of less 
use in qualification for informal work if these methods are not tailored to the needs of 
informal employment. Moreover, time spent in formal education is time not spent in an 
informal apprenticeship or in informal employment (less years of experience or less chance at 
attaining a skill), meaning a potentially worse outcome. This may explain the low returns to 
formal education and the fact that illiterates were likely to earn better, all else equal, than 
those who had completed primary or preparatory school in both formal and informal 
employment. If the years between age 6 and 15 are applied toward learning a trade rather than 
attending school, informal skills can be acquired, which may increase wages and even the 
chance of formal employment in one’s trade. 
Further research into this area could bring up new results, but these speculations offer an 
explanation for the results observed in the data. 
 
Labor market expectations and the polarization of qualification 
It can be expected that, recognizing the outcome of the formality decision on a macro 
level, both employers and workers will “use” informal employment in particular situations. 
For employers – even in the public sector – it is advantageous to hire informal employees for 
unskilled, temporary, or occasional jobs where the costs of formal employment would be 
higher. Small producers are also likely to always use informal employment for the reasons 
listed above, and because this represents a cost advantage when competing with other small 
producers and large firms. Employees may enter informal employment at the beginning of 
their career, for both the reasons listed above and because informal employment may 
represent a means of earning money casually before finding a more lucrative formal 
opportunity. This would explain the trend shown in Section IV of most workers – even those 
formally employed at the time of the survey – having begun in informal employment. 
More broadly, many workers will have expectations about their long-term labor 
trajectories and whether they are to enter formal or informal employment in the long run. 
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Those who expect to gain formal public sector employment will remain in school and attempt 
to gain formal credentials which improve the likelihood and outcome of employment. The 
same is very likely to be true for those expecting to work in private formal employment, who 
are more likely to stay in school and enroll in (para-formal) courses to attain skills that will be 
of use for a formal private employer. 
Employees who expect to stay in informal employment in the long run will likely prepare 
themselves, meanwhile, with informal qualifications such as informal work experience, an 
apprenticeship, social contacts or negotiating skills. The reward for these qualifications may 
be higher wages in informal employment, or even the potential to become an employer one 
day and hire others. Given this trajectory, formal schooling may be a hindrance to labor 
market success because of the years spent not working and the inability to become an 
apprentice following the completion of schooling.118 
The existence of different “tracks” of qualification for formal and informal employment 
thus could lead to a polarization of qualification outcomes – an effect observed in the 
distribution of educated workers into public and private formal employment and those with 
less schooling or skills acquired from a craftsman into informal employment. This does not 
have to be strict, however – the results also showed illiterates in formal employment and 
some with a post-graduate education in informal employment; it may be possible and even 
advantageous for some workers to switch from formal to informal employment or vice versa 
and, in so doing, retain their rough wage level. This would explain the high returns to higher 
education in informal employment and the lack of a formality premium in the panel data 
equations with fixed effects.  
Further, those employees who use informal employment as a training ground before 
entering formal work, as suggested by Maloney (1998) and supported in the evidence of 
unidirectional mobility to formal employment, represent an important exception to the trend 
of polarization of qualification, as they likely have gained formal qualification for the long 
term even though they are currently informally employed. The general result remains to be a 
tendency toward the extremes of little schooling and much informal experience, or formal 
schooling with para-formal qualification mechanisms roughly dividing the labor markets. 
 
                                                
118 In several conversations with knowledgeable labor market observers, it was stated that informal employers often prefer an 
apprentice who has not been “spoiled” by schooling, but who was an “empty page” for informal training.  
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Relation to dual labor market theory and the formal-informal wage premium 
The polarization of qualification outcomes could have important macro-level effects on 
labor markets for youth, including a wage structure outcome which would parallel the result 
predicted by labor market dualism, but would in fact be explainable by qualification. When 
the mobility of some workers from informal to formal employment is considered, a result 
mirroring the “dualistic dualism” proposed by Maloney (2004) and Günther and Launov 
(2006) may result. It can be suggested that this applies to urban Egypt. 
Again, it is important to review the dualistic hypothesis and the concordant possibilities 
for a formal-informal wage premium identified previously. Using the efficiency wage variant 
of the dualistic hypothesis, employers pay a wage above the market clearing rate – and thus 
hire less workers than available – in order to achieve certain productivity effects; those who 
cannot find a job paying at this rate would earn less in informal employment. This could 
explain the formal-informal wage premium apparent in some of the estimations by 
Marcouiller et al. (1997), Badaoui et al. (2007), and Assaad (1996). Newer studies such as 
Maloney (2004) and Günther and Launov (2006) discuss a further division of informal 
employees into an “upper tier” and “lower tier” group – a kind of “dualistic dualism”. It is 
contended that the upper tier of informal workers choose to be employed informally, because 
it is more advantageous to them, while the lower tier would prefer to be in formal 
employment. The basic idea of barriers to entry continues to drive the results. 
If the two types of employment reward differing types of qualification, however, and 
there is a polarization of individuals toward one of two tracks, then this represents an 
alternative explanation for segmentation in the labor market. Specifically, individuals who 
have become qualified informally may not be able to fully transfer these skills to formal 
employment, and vice versa. As an example, a mechanic who had trained as an informal 
apprentice may not be able to find a formal job, and if so, only at a much lower wage. A 
formally trained service employee may gain entry to informal work, but not be able to apply 
the skills acquired there, thus also receiving a lower wage. Precisely because formal and 
informal work prefer different means of skill attainment and qualification, it may not be 
possible to transfer skills without some cost for most individuals. This creates a qualification 
barrier between formal and informal work, with very select movement between the two. 
The next necessary step to explain a dualistic wage structure would be a reason for an 
absolute wage differential between the two sectors, to which several non-qualification-related 
explanations can be used. For example, of the factors associated with informal firms is small 
firm size, which is known to bring about lower wages for employees in various national 
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contexts.119 The correlation of informal work with small firms could lower average wages. 
Another correlated factor is the capital constraints of informal firms, which also should lead 
to lower wages given the known link between the capital intensity of a job and wages.120  
The important question is why such formal-informal wage gaps would persist over time, 
given that in a competitive labor market, any systematic premium to formal employment 
should induce a migration of workers from informal to formal work, eventually evening out 
the expected lifetime income in both for a marginal worker. Yet three options present 
themselves to justify an ongoing differential. First, there may be a degree of “path 
dependency” of qualification if a worker expects to enter one type of employment and the 
relative wages change; in this case, it would be costlier to switch paths than to continue in the 
same type of employment, even if the relative wages were lower. Second, there may be non-
wage benefits to informal employment such as the opportunity to work with friends and 
relatives. Whether these benefits are greater than the benefits of formal employment – such as 
medical insurance – is an open question. Finally, and most probably, it could be that factors 
such as innate ability and social milieu play into which trajectory a worker chooses, meaning 
that the formal and informal groups are not truly comparable. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that there is a class dimension to the formality of employment, a topic which cannot be 
analyzed further here. 
If this is combined with the known movement of some workers who expect formal 
employment in the long run through entry positions in informal employment, then  these new 
entrants – who are less qualified in informal mechanisms than their informally trained 
counterparts – could also pull down the average wage. If experience is not measured or 
measured imperfectly this would create the appearance of a higher formal-informal wage gap. 
Further, the division of informal employees into two groups – an “informal-to-formal” 
and a “skilled informal” group – is logical. The informal-to-formal group will expect to 
eventually be employed in formal employment and thus use primarily formal modes of 
qualification, resulting in lower wages in informal work yet higher wages later. The skilled 
informal group will expect to remain in informal employment throughout their career, and 
thus tend toward informal qualification which will bring higher wages. The skilled informal 
group corresponds roughly to an upper tier of informal employees, while the informal-to-
formal group is a (temporary) lower tier. 
                                                
119 See Schwimmer, 2007, for a review of the literature and theoretical explanations. It has frequently been observed that 
smaller companies pay up to 30% less for the same jobs than larger companies – which Schwimmer attributes to the higher 
division of labor in larger companies and consequent greater need for highly skilled individuals. 
120 Goldin and Katz, 1998 
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Table 8: Characteristics of Formal, informal-to-formal, skilled informal and unskilled informal trends in urban Egypt 
     
 Formal Informal-to-formal Skilled informal Unskilled Informal 
Formal qualification Formal schooling, 
higher education 
Formal schooling, 
higher education 
Little schooling, exit for 
full-time work 
Little or no schooling, 
exit for full-time work 
Para-formal qualification Courses, formal on-the-
job training 
Courses, informal on-
the-job training 
Informal on-the-job Informal on-the-job 
Informal qualification None Some informal training Informal apprenticeship Some informal training 
Work conditions Brief hours, high wages Longer hours, low 
wages 
Longer hours, higher 
wages 
Irregular hours, very low 
wages 
(Unemployment) (High) (Low in informal work, 
high in formal) 
(Low) (Low) 
Job search methods Government, formal 
applications, friends and 
relatives 
Government, formal 
applications, friends and 
relatives; social contacts 
Primarily friends, 
relatives, and social 
contacts 
Primarily friends, 
relatives, and social 
contacts 
Labor market trajectory Formal employment Formal employment Informal employment Labor force exit 
     
 
The lower tier could include one more “unskilled informal” group, however, which is 
somewhat more familiar to the traditional dualistic structure. This group, made up of unpaid 
family workers and especially informally employed females, can expect lower wages and 
little formal or informal qualification. The reasons why this might apply especially to females 
are analyzed in the next sub-section. Table 8 presents some hypotheses about each group. 
A definitive answer to the question of segmentation in urban labor markets is still elusive, 
and as always would be a task for an empirical test such as simulation of earnings in formal 
and informal employment, or survey evidence which asks workers to characterize the chances 
of gaining formal employment, and whether there are perceived barriers. The results derived 
in this analysis offer one proposition for how a dualistic structure to the labor market – and to 
informal employees – may be possible in urban Egypt even in the absence of formal barriers 
to entry. 
 
Gender differentials in returns to qualification 
A final line of analysis is segmentation of qualification returns along gender lines, 
including the reasons for the observed lack of returns to schooling and lower level and 
unexplained variation of wages in informal employment. Of course, gender differentials in 
wages are an extremely important topic in every labor market and are one of the primary uses 
of Oaxaca-Blinder models.121 Among urban youth in Egypt, it has been shown that young 
women are much less likely to be economically active and, where they are employed formally 
and informally, consistently earn less than their male counterparts. Moreover, females are less 
likely to be rewarded for formal, para-formal, and informal qualification. Three factors that 
are known to have a strong effect on the labor market outcomes of women are: constrained 
                                                
121 See Oaxaca, 1973, whose focus is on male-female wage differentials. 
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labor supply due to domestic responsibilities and fertility; lack of labor market mobility; and 
social expectations about women’s work, which relate closely to issues of gender 
discrimination. All of these can have an effect on the absolute level of young women’s wages, 
and thus account for the absolute wage gaps, but they also can have an impact on the returns 
to qualification for females. 
The labor supply issue is well-known. Young women are more likely to have domestic 
responsibilities – which can be expressed as a high reservation wage – and leave the labor 
force after marriage or childbearing, offering a disincentive for both employers and 
employees to invest in qualification. This is especially applicable in informal employment, 
where females are often employed for only a limited time period between school and 
marriage. As seen in the data, this type of work is often not continued past the age of 25, 
undermining the rationale for intensive skills training. Experience in an informal job could be 
less skilled and on-the-job training less likely, which would weaken the effect of the work 
experience term in the wage decomposition; one would also expect fewer costly investments 
such as schooling or courses, affecting absolute level of qualification. Formal public 
employment is more likely to be continued after marriage – partly because of the higher 
wages and more equitable employment chances for education females – which should 
encourage employer and employee to invest more heavily in skills training. While higher 
returns were not apparent in the data, a higher absolute level of wages for formally employed 
women may have to do with this difference in qualification levels. 
Labor mobility works along comparable grounds, although here the lack of mobility 
between jobs by young women could actually serve as an incentive for employers to invest 
more in training for women. Since it is unlikely that the employee will be “poached” and thus 
investments in training accrue to another employer, precisely the lack of mobility serves as a 
guarantee for long-term investments in female employees’ human capital. This would serve as 
a countervailing effect, increasing the coefficient to years of employment experience. Yet the 
lack of mobility can also be exploited monopsonistically, allowing an employer to pay 
uncompetitively low wages without danger of losing the employee. Dedeoglu (2004) offered 
evidence for family workers in Turkey that training is intensive and rents mostly captured by 
family, and not the worker. Thus, it may be possible to increase a worker’s productivity 
through training without paying a commensurate premium. If this is the case, the returns to 
qualification to the employee will be low and unmeasurable in statistical analysis. 
Finally, there are specific social expectations about women’s work, which tie in very 
closely with the classic theory of labor market discrimination – whether through employers, 
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employees, or customers with a taste for discrimination122, or due to a perceived statistical 
correlation between gender and productivity123. Certain skilled occupations are understood as 
“men’s work” and women generally discouraged from entry. Expectations for marriage and 
family play a role for both young men and women, yet women – who are not expected to be 
primary providers – may be passed over for prime jobs and specialized skill attainment, 
crowding young women into less skilled trades. Bargaining power regarding wages may also 
play a role, as women could be in a weaker bargaining position in relation to employers, 
impacting both wages and training opportunities.124 Thus, discrimination provides further 
hindrances for women to obtain formal and informal qualification, and lower returns on those 
qualifications which are obtained. Further research into these topics in Egypt is highly 
warranted. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Since the new Labor Law of 2003, the regulatory framework for employment has become 
much more flexible and employer-friendly; it is expected that with these reforms, the 
incentives for employers and employees to bypass labor laws through informal employment 
relationships have been weakened greatly. Furthermore, there have recently been attempts by 
Egyptian state agencies to register and formalize informal firms and workers, and the ranks of 
the formal have grown greatly over the past several years.125 Perhaps the trend toward 
informalization is turning around, which is a largely positive development, for at least three 
reasons. First, informal employment is known to mean lack of social and legal protection, 
precarity of employment, and possibly lower wages, all of which are problematic for workers, 
particularly youth, females, and those with little schooling. Secondly, the informal economy 
as a whole is characterized by intransparency, lack of standardization, and asymmetric 
information – which create information rents and are negative for both economic efficiency 
and income distribution. Finally, the erosion of social legislation and the tax base through 
informal economic activity impede public initiatives in the economy. It can be debated 
whether the interactions between the formal and informal economies are positive – because 
the informal economy tends to lower production costs and prices and serve as a labor “shock 
absorber” in downturns – or negative – because informal labor uncompetitively undercuts 
formal labor and thus punishes legality. In any case, the choice made by the Egyptian state 
                                                
122 Becker, 1957 
123 A discussion of these topics and the literature is available in Berk, 2001. Berk traces the debate back to Arrow, Phelps, 
Spence, and Reder, all of whom wrote during the early 1970’s on similar topics in non-taste-based discrimination. 
124 Al Amry, 2008 
125 For a good summary of recent initiatives, see El-Megharbel, 2007. 
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seems to have taken the disadvantages of informality into account, and reacted to reduce the 
phenomenon. 
Nonetheless, this analysis suggests one more reason that decision makers should be 
careful in designing such policies. It has been shown that a large part of the youth labor force 
continues to rely on informal modes of qualification – likely due to expectations of later 
informal work experience – which are not as highly rewarded in formal employment. It is 
suggested that many workers actually earn better, given current conditions, in informal jobs 
than in formal, and that formalization would mean a welfare loss to precisely this socially 
weak segment of the labor force. Indeed, this finding is congruent with other studies, such as 
Galal (2004), who showed that formalization without concurrent reform of labor and tax 
institutions would mean a welfare loss for workers, small firms, and the economy. Such 
attempts at establishing formal institutions without a co-opting of informal training 
institutions may repeat misstakes of the past, as many Arab governments effectively 
undermined traditional sectors through misguided formalization of training, as discussed by 
Al-Heeti and Brock (1997). The demise during the 20th century of many Egyptian handicraft 
industries could arguably be traced back to failed industrial and training policies. 
Thus, the call by several commentators on informality (El Mahdi, 2003; Light, 2004; 
Schneider and Enste, 2002) to co-opt informal actors into the formal legal institutions and 
create a facilitating environment for small, currently informal actors is lent further support. 
Although further policy recommendations are not appropriate given the speculative nature of 
the results, the analysis can add weight to a sensible argument by others. 
In summary, this paper has argued that informal employment does reward qualification, 
but that it does so primarily through informal mechanisms such as the informal apprenticeship 
and on-the-job training, as well as unobservable social capital factors. Having discussed 
critically the concepts of informal economies and informal employment, some observations 
about qualification in informal and formal employment have been described. Using a Oaxaca-
blinder framework and ELMPS data, a divergence of qualification mechanisms can be shown 
for formal and informal employment using both separated single-period data, and two-period 
panel data using individual fixed effects. Other significant results are a union, medical 
insurance, and formality premium, the last of which disappears when controlling for 
individual effects, and a large gender differential, especially in informal employment. A 
theoretical discussion has discussed these effects, suggesting how the formality decision – 
which is endogenous and likely to vary along with other job characteristics – could also have 
an exogenous impact on returns to qualification and, thus, on labor market outcomes. 
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Specifically, a polarization of labor market trajectories and qualification has been proposed, 
which could explain formal-informal wage differentials even in the absence of strict barriers. 
Further disaggregation provides an explanation of the two-tier hypothesis of informal 
employment. It has been also proposed that the lower returns to qualification for females can 
be explained through female-specific labor supply and mobility effects, and through labor 
market discrimination. 
Future research could investigate the issue of qualification for informal employment 
further, and perhaps new data can show how other forms of qualification are rewarded. A 
more sophisticated empirical model can come up with deeper results, using a selection model 
or multi-period panel data. Perhaps more in-depth field research could provide better and 
more nuanced examples of informal qualification, which would allow a much variegated 
analysis of this unrecorded and rapidly changing phenomenon. 
Important questions which cannot be looked at here are formal, para-formal, and informal 
institutions are changing over time, as well as the long-term expectations of youths and their 
families in the labor market, and how they perceive qualification and job opportunities. It is 
clear that quick changes in both institutions and outcome-shaping perceptions are taking place 
in the wake of new reforms, which will doubtless have far-reaching, long-term impacts. 
Macroeconomically, the link between informality and unemployment among youth in urban 
Egypt could be examined, as Boughzala and Kouki (2003) have done for Tunisia. Due to the 
topical focus of this essay, no attempt at discussing unemployment trends has been made, 
even though there are clear and important connections between unemployment and informal 
employment in Egypt. 
Finally, an interesting theoretical question is whether formal employment or informal 
employment of urban Egyptian youth more closely matches the predictions of neoclassical 
labor market theory. Formal employment, which is legally regulated and standardized by the 
institutions of the state, clearly also has some form of job rationing and imperfect entry, while 
credentials may hold more importance than actual productivity differences in wage setting. 
Informal employment, meanwhile, though supposedly characterized by a lack of regulation 
and “free entry”, is actually highly regulated through informal institutions and social contacts, 
and particular segments may be even more protected – via social barriers – than formal 
employment. Thus, neither type of employment truly matches neoclassical predictions. This 
state, distressing or intriguing for the theorist, is unlikely to be unique to Egypt. A theory 
including some form of barriers to entry and market segmentation may be a closer 
approximation to the reality of many developed and developing country labor markets. 
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Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table A1 –  Probit regressions for formality of employment    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Wage workers Male wage workers Female wage wrkrs Whole sample Males Females 
Education             
Read/write 0.219 (0.90) 0.206 (0.78) 0.214 (0.29) 0.328 (1.64) 0.319 (1.39) 0.366 (0.65) 
Primary school 0.111 (0.60) 0.108 (0.54) -0.072 (-0.14) 0.203 (1.44) 0.268 (1.64) -0.017 (-0.05) 
Preparatory school 0.207 (0.97) 0.096 (0.41) 0.796 (1.38) 0.151 (1.01) 0.155 (0.89) 0.219 (0.63) 
General sec. ed. 0.297 (0.70) 0.455 (1.03)   -0.349 (-1.49) -0.326 (-1.30)   
Voc. sec. – agr. 0.279 (1.01) 0.310 (1.04) 0.089 (0.11) 0.485** (2.49) 0.493** (2.26) 0.763 (1.57) 
Voc. sec. – ind. 0.431*** (2.83) 0.461*** (2.76) 0.069 (0.15) 0.501*** (4.31) 0.567*** (4.14) 0.404 (1.41) 
Voc. sec. – com. 0.177 (1.07) 0.214 (1.10) 0.137 (0.39) 0.357*** (2.88) 0.404** (2.50) 0.506** (2.11) 
Voc. sec. – 5yr.       0.972** (2.06) 0.674 (0.90) 1.239 (1.64) 
Post-secondary 0.362* (1.75) 0.354 (1.50) 0.532 (1.14) 0.354** (2.28) 0.276 (1.42) 0.915*** (3.22) 
University – 4yr. 0.523*** (3.31) 0.455** (2.49) 0.680** (1.98) 0.450*** (3.86) 0.354** (2.42) 0.700*** (3.05) 
University – 5yr. 1.105*** (2.97) 1.024*** (2.60)   0.463* (1.90) 0.467* (1.68) 0.991** (1.99) 
Post-graduate 0.161 (0.25)   -0.156 (-0.20) 0.346 (0.60)   -0.053 (-0.08) 
             
Skills acquired             
Regular schooling 0.968*** (9.24) 0.834*** (6.72) 1.182*** (5.38) 2.225*** (27.93) 1.556*** (15.25) 3.210*** (21.67) 
Vocational training 0.742*** (3.65) 0.708*** (2.99) 0.819* (1.91) 1.732*** (9.55) 1.206*** (5.66) 2.786*** (7.52) 
Through contractor -1.399*** (-3.84) -1.464*** (-3.99)   -0.221 (-0.82) -0.545** (-1.99)   
Through craftsman -0.586*** (-5.11) -0.644*** (-5.24) -0.193 (-0.48) 0.358*** (3.80) 0.011 (0.11) 1.368*** (3.62) 
Courses/other -0.003 (-0.02) -0.038 (-0.29) 0.096 (0.32) 0.664*** (7.48) 0.313*** (3.12) 1.435*** (6.93) 
             
Personal char.             
Female 0.242** (2.31)     -0.359*** (-4.68)     
Married 0.545*** (4.32) 0.282* (1.65) 0.940*** (4.37) -0.071 (-0.85) 0.209 (1.44) 0.011 (0.08) 
HH Head -0.174 (-1.23) 0.012 (0.07)   0.502*** (4.94) 0.277* (1.87) 0.186 (0.44) 
Age 0.101*** (7.49) 0.115*** (7.37) 0.053* (1.81) 0.104*** (10.85) 0.129*** (11.02) 0.075*** (3.67) 
             
Region             
Alex./Canal Cities 0.069 (0.63) -0.028 (-0.23) 0.376 (1.59) 0.125 (1.48) 0.050 (0.48) 0.355** (2.11) 
Upper Egypt -0.095 (-0.88) -0.120 (-0.99) -0.117 (-0.48) -0.066 (-0.80) -0.078 (-0.80) -0.005 (-0.03) 
Lower Egypt -0.126 (-1.23) -0.260** (-2.21) 0.273 (1.17) -0.075 (-0.96) -0.131 (-1.39) 0.016 (0.10) 
             
Constant -3.256*** (-9.07) -3.460*** (-8.46) -2.332*** (-2.93) -4.318*** (-16.62) -4.650*** (-15.07) -4.601*** (-8.21) 
Observations 1,564 1,209 342 6,123 3,048 2,692 
R2 0.312 0.282 0.355 0.469 0.377 0.656 
 
Note: estimations (1) through (3) predict the probability of a wage worker being formally employed for all wage workers, 
male wage worker and female wage workers. This group is, however, also self-selected, as the decision to enter wage work is 
itself endogenous to numerous considerations. Estimations (4) through (6), therefore, estimate the probability of formal 
employment for the entire sample of youth, whether economically active or not. Possibilities for a two-stage model of 
selection (first into wage work and then into formal employment) have been considered but in the end have not been used. 
All attempts to integrated the predicted value of the above regressions into the wage decompositions has failed to yield 
superior results. 
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Figure A1: Wage histograms of employment groups 
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Figure A2: Map of Egypt with regions 
 
 
Source: http://www.diggerhistory2.info/graveyards/pages/others/egypt.htm, accessed Sep. 10, 2008. 
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